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Article 5

EXILE, AMNESTY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
Leila Nadya Sadat*
This Article examines recent state and international practice regarding
amnesties forjus cogens crimes, particularly casesfrom Latin America as
well as international courts and tribunals, and explores the transnational
legal dialogue between courts, and to a lesser degree, legislatures, that has led
to international norm creation in this area, strengthening the prohibition
against amnesties considerably. At the same time, constraints upon the exercise of universaljurisdiction, whether imposed by legislatures, articulated in
judicial opinions, or created by internationaltreaty, have provided a political check to the otherwise unbounded exercise of universal jurisdiction by
states and the exercise of universal internationaljurisdictionby the international community taken as a whole. Indeed, this Article suggests that the
question of amnestiesfor war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide
raises profound questions about the nature and form of internationalcriminal law-its substantive content, temporal dimensions, and constitutional
status. This Article challenges the conventional wisdom that "swappingjusticefor peace, " is morally and practically acceptable. Instead, what longitudinal studies we have suggest that amnesty deals typically foster a culture of
impunity in which violence becomes the norm, rather than the exception.
© 2006 Leila Nadya Sadat. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce
and distribute copies of this Article in any format, at or below cost, for educational
purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre
Dame Law Review, and includes this provision and copyright notice.
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This Article considers amnesties from a jurisdictionalapproach, in which
domestic, transnationaland internationalamnesties are considered in both
horizontal and vertical perspective. Finally, while noting that international
criminaljustice is not a "one size fits all" proposition, and that carefully
tailored and culturally sensitive approaches suitable to individual cases are
required, this Article underscores the importance of the emerging normative
and legal structure apparent in internationalcriminal law, as well as the
needfor imperial powers such as the United States to submit themselves to the
rule of law in order to enhance the legitimacy and effectiveness of the rules.
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INTRODUCTION

Recently, it seemed as if exile and amnesty had become fashionable again.' Before the U.S. invasion of Iraq, Saddam Hussein was offered the opportunity to leave Iraq to save his country.2

Donald

Rumsfeld, U.S. Secretary of Defense, suggested that the "senior leadership" in Iraq and their families should be afforded safe haven in
some other country to avoid the prospect of war. 3 Later that year,
Charles Taylor, President of Liberia, was convinced to accept exile in

Nigeria. 4 Shortly thereafter, Haiti's President Jean Bertrand Aristide
1 Historically, exile and amnesty emerged as techniques for moving a society
forward through political transition, civil war or other fundamental conflict. Indeed,
political exile has ancient roots. The modern term "ostracism" originated from the
Greek word ostrakon, which was the name for the clay tablets used as ballots in votes to
decide for or against banishment. This practice was initiated by Solon in Athens in
509 B.C.E. as a means of defeating political rivals who proved dangerous either politically or physically. PAUL TABORI, THE ANATOMY OF EXILE 1, 46 (1972). Exile in antiquity could also befall those whose actions merely displeased the ruler or emperor, and
although political exiles such as Napoleon appear to be the exception, rather than
the rule, more recently intellectuals, writers and artists-such as Dante, Voltaire,
Hugo and Grotius-have been routinely exiled for their political and social views. Id.
at 69-71, 84, 89-91, 111-12. Exile also appears to have been particularly appealing in
monarchical political systems, where royal leaders often personally imbued both sovereign and divine authority. The example of the Stuarts, exiled from Great Britain
and given residence in France by King Louis XIV at Saint Germain-en-Laye comes to
mind.

See, e.g., BRYAN BEVAN, KING JAMES THE THIRD OF ENGLAND: A STUDY OF KING-

SHIP IN EXILE (1967);JAMES LEES-MILNE, THE LAST STUARTS: BRITISH ROYALTY IN EXILE

(1983).
2 On the evening of March 17, 2003, President Bush declared "Saddam Hussein
and his sons must leave Iraq within 48 hours," or war would result. Bush's Speech on
Iraq: "Saddam Hussein and His Sons Must Leave, "N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2003, at A14.
3 Lateline: US Offers Exile to Saddam Hussein (Australian Broadcasting Corporation
television broadcast Feb. 20, 2003), available at http://www.abc.net.au/lateline/content/2003/s789392.htm. It is not clear where Saddam would have been able to go,
although one commentator suggested (tongue in cheek) St. Helena, Napoleon's last
demeure. William F. Buckley, Jr., On the Right: A Future for Saddam, NAT'L REv., Feb.
24, 2003, at 58. Others suggested Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Belarus. News Hour with
Jim Lehrer: Saddam in Exile? (PBS television broadcastJan. 20, 2003), available at http:/
/www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/middle-east/jan-juneO3/saddam-1-20.html.
4 Taylor arrived in Calabar, Nigeria, with his wife, daughters and a large entourage in August 2003 and remains there as of this writing. Under the terms of his
asylum, Mr. Taylor was apparently forbidden from communicating with anyone involved in political, illegal or government activities in Liberia. Anna Borzello, Nigeria
Warns Exiled Taylor, BBC NEWS, Sept. 17, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/
africa/3115992.stm. According to news reports, the U.S. government supported Taylor's exile, believing that it would save lives, US Denies Charles Taylor Bounty, BBC NEWS,
Nov. 13, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/3266075.stm, and opposed
congressional efforts to offer a $2 million bounty for his capture, and to force Nigeria
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was deposed and took up residence in South Africa. 5
Exile can of course be tantamount to imprisonment for those
obliged to endure it. Napoleon was sent by the British to St. Helena
(after escaping his first offshore prison at Elba), where he lived in
considerably reduced circumstances and ultimately perished, apparently poisoned by arsenic in the wallpaper of his chamber. 6 Indeed,
banishment was a significant punishment in a world without satellite
television, internet access, cellular telephones or even regular mail
service, and where travel to and from remote locations was infrequent
(or nonexistent) and often dangerous. Modern exile, however, is considerably more pleasant. Although banished from kin and country,
today's exiles often bring with them generous bank accounts and retire to live with a small retinue somewhere peaceful, and often quite
attractive. Ferdinand Marcos found a haven in Hawaii; 7 Haiti's "Baby
Doc" Duvalier fled to the south of France;8 Ethiopia's Mengistu Haile
to extradite Taylor to the Special Court for Sierra Leone, pursuant to an indictment
issued by that court, Taylor: Fugitive, or Exile?, CBS NEWS, Nov. 14, 2003, http://
www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/11/14/world/main583572.shtml.
According to
news reports, Taylor's exile was also supported by U.N. envoy Jacques Klein, although
the United Nations generally takes the position that amnesties for war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity are incompatible with international law. See, e.g.,
U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm'n on Human Rights, Promotion and
Protection of Human Rights,
20-24, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/L.93 (Apr. 15, 2005).
Many have contended that Nigerian President Obasanjo offered the asylum as a
means of deflecting attention away from potential charges against Obasanjo himself
for atrocities committed against unarmed civilians by troops under his orders. LiberiaNigeria: Questions Raised over Taylor's Exile in Nigeria, BIAFRANIGERIAWORLD, Aug. 23,
2003, http://news.biafranigeriaworld.com/archive/2003/aug/23/0024.html.
5 Gary Marx, Haitiansin a Vise of Nature, Politics: Weeks After Floods Killed at Least
1, 900 in Gonaives, ReliefEfforts Have Faltered in a Climate of Violence over Who Should Rule,
TRIB., Nov. 25, 2004, § 1, at 1.
6 Napoleon Bonaparte was exiled to Elba, Italy's third biggest island, following
his abdication at Fontainebleau. He arrived at the island on May 4, 1814. He was
allowed a personal escort of some 1000 men, a household staff, and was even permitted the title of "Emperor of Elba" with authority over its 100,000 people. He escaped
from Elba on February 26, 1815, with his miniature army, and landed in France. PAUL
CHI.

JOHNSON, NAPOLEAN

7

145-52 (2002).

Bernard Gwertzman, Marcos Appealingfor Aid in FindingHaven Outside U.S., N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 16, 1986, § 1, at 1 (discussing Marcos's reported unhappiness with his
reception in Hawaii and the U.S. government's dilemma concerning the large sums
of money and jewelry aboard the planes that took the Marcos party to Hawaii).
8 In 1986, amid riots, rebellions, and rampant corruption, dictator Jean-Claude
"Baby Doc" Duvalier fled Haiti for exile in France on a United States Air Force flight.
No government in the world agreed to grant Duvalier permanent asylum, as the massive human rights abuses committed by his regime were well known. 'Baby Doc' Case
Thrown out, BBC NEWS, May 12, 1999 [hereinafter "Baby Doc" Case], http://
news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/341691.stm; see also Paul Lewis, Move by Duvalier
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Miriam sought refuge in Zimbabwe; 9 and Uganda's Idi Amin recently
died after many years living peaceably in Saudi Arabia.' 0
During the second half of the twentieth century, offering exile or
amnesty to individuals accused of human rights atrocities collided
with the erection of a new system of international criminal justice.
While exile might still be an option for individuals accused of general
venality-tax fraud, corruption, or embezzlement-the notion of allowing the perpetrators of human rights atrocities to go unpunished
appears to have become normatively unacceptable. Fueled by the
horrors of the Second World War, inspired by the relative success of
the Nuremberg trials and nourished by the aspirations of democratization and the new rhetoric of international human rights that followed the establishment of the United Nations, the "impunity"
paradigm came to be replaced by calls for accountability and a demand for the investigation and criminal prosecution of those who ordered or committed human rights atrocities. Indeed, requiring
accountability for past crimes has been posited by both scholars and
practitioners as a remedy to impunity, as well as a necessary, if not
sufficient, predicate for the reestablishment of peace." Accordingly,
to Riviera Is Seen: Press Agency Says Haitian Is Buying a Village Chateau, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
7, 1986, at All. Upon arriving in France, the Duvaliers took up residence in the
French Riviera in an estate rented from the family of a Saudi financier. Jonathan C.
Randal, Haiti Loses Lawsuit Against Duvalier: French Court Sets Back Government Bid To
Recover $150 Million, WASH. POST, June 24, 1987, at A22. Since 1986, there have been
a few attempts to bring Duvalier to justice for the human rights abuses committed
while he was in power in Haiti, as well as for the alleged corruption of his regime. He
remains in France, though is believed to be sick and destitute. "Baby Doc" Case, supra.
9 Ex-Ethiopia Chief Reaches Zimbabwe, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1991, at A9.
10 See Ethan Bronner, Editorial, The Obscenely Easy Exile of Idi Amin, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 19, 2003, at A20 (describing Amin's nearly twenty-five-year exile spent in a spacious villa with several of his children); see also Reed Brody, Idi Amin at Death's Door:
Despots Should Not Rest in Peace, INT'L HERALD TRiB. (Paris), July 25, 2003, at 8. Amin
died on August 16, 2003, in Saudi Arabia having apparently been told he would face
arrest in Uganda if he returned there to die. Amin was responsible for the deaths of
at least 300,000 opponents (some put the figure much higher at 500,000). Former
Ugandan Dictator Idi Amin Dies, CNN.coM, Aug. 16, 2003, http://www.cnn.com/
2003/WORLD/africa/08/16/saudi.amin/.
11 See Payam Akhavan, Justice in the Hague, Peace in the Former Yugoslavia?: A Commentary on the United Nations War Crimes Tribunal,20 HUM. RTS. Q. 737, 746 (1998); M.
Cherif Bassiouni, The Normative Framework of InternationalHumanitarianLaw: Overlaps,
Gaps and Ambiguities, 8 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 199, 203 (1998); Antonio
Cassese, On the Current Trends Towards CriminalProsecution and Punishment of Breaches of
InternationalHumanitarianLaw, 9 EUR. J. INT'L L. 2, 3-4 (1998); Diane F. Orentlicher,
Settling Accounts: The Duty To Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, 100
YALE L.J. 2537, 2546 (1991); Naomi Roht-Arriaza, State Responsibility To Investigate and
Prosecute Grave Human Rights Violations in InternationalLaw, 78 CAL. L. REv. 449 (1990).
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the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda
(ICTR) and the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), and the Special War Crimes Panels for East Timor
was conceived of by the international community, and perhaps particularly by the United States, 12 as a means (although not the means) to
reestablish peace and stability, foster a transition to democratic principles of government, and establish general principles of international
law to deter future atrocities. The negotiation and establishment of
the International Criminal Court (ICC) treaty in 199813 drew heavily
from this emerging practice, and seemed to offer the imprimatur of

permanence to a then experimental concept.
Yet, even as the ad hoc tribunals have continued their work and
the International Criminal Court has commenced its activities, many
challenges to international criminal accountability remain. Some are
practical in nature: the desire to trade peace for justice in order to
end a conflict more quickly, even if temporarily; the overwhelming
task of bringing cases against hundreds or even thousands of individuals implicated in the commission of genocide or other mass atrocities;
and even the passage of time, which may cause authorities to hesitate
in pursuing justice or extinguish otherwise valid cases through the application of statutes of limitations. Others question the entire international criminal justice endeavor itself,14 arguing that criminal trials
may be counterproductive in fostering reconciliation, or that justice,
But see CARLOS SANTIAGO NINO, RADIcAL EVIL ON TRIAL (1996); Carlos S. Nino, The
Duty To Punish Past Abuses of Human Rights Put into Context: The Case of Argentina, 100
YALE LJ. 2619 (1991); MarkJ. Osiel, Why Prosecute? Critics of Punishmentfor Mass Atroc-

ity, 22 HUM. RTS. Q. 118, 133 (2000).
12 Although the U.S. administration currently opposes the International Criminal
Court, see, e.g., Leila Nadya Sadat, Summer in Rome, Spring in the Hague, Winter in Washington?: U.S. Policy Towards the International Criminal Court, 21 Wis. INT'L L.J. 557
(2003), U.S. leadership was critical to the establishment of the ICTY and ICTR, the
SCSL, and even in bringing the Sudan situation to the U.N. Security Council, see, e.g.,
Warren Hoge, U.N. Will Refer Darfur Crimes to Court in Hague, INT'L HERALD TRIB.
(Paris), Apr. 2, 2005, at 6.
13 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal,July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90
[hereinafter Rome Statute].
14 One variant of this critique suggests that international law enforcement is so
sporadic that it is unlikely to deter, and so plagued with "liberal" safeguards for criminal defendants that powerful international criminals are often able to thwart the international tribunals' ability to mete out justice. Tom J. Farer, Restraining the
Barbarians:Can International CriminalLaw Help?, 22 HuM. RTS. Q. 90, 92, 98 (2000).
Another suggests that enthusiasm for the accountability paradigm results from "a perplexing fusion of exuberance and undertheorizing." Mark A. Drumbl, Collective Violence and Individual Punishment: The Criminality of Mass Atrocity, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 539,
547 (2005).

2006]

EXILE,

AMNESTY

AND

INTERNATIONAL

LAW

to be effective, must be local, rather than international, in character.' 5
Finally, the fledgling international justice system has encountered political and ideological objections from those concerned with its constraint of state power. The U.S. objections to the International
Criminal Court fall into this category, predicated as they are on the
argument that international norms on accountability (particularly as
embodied in the International Criminal Court Treaty) are problematic insofar as they might affect the conduct of U.S. foreign affairs, or
16
impinge upon U.S. citizens' ability to travel abroad with impunity.
These challenges notwithstanding, there is substantial countervailing evidence that the notion of accountability has gained considerable traction in international and domestic state practice, as this
Article makes clear. The SCSL Appeals Chamber ruled, for example,
in 2004 that the Lom6 Accord, which granted amnesty to the perpetrators of crimes committed during the conflict in Sierra Leone, could
not deprive the SCSL of jurisdiction given that the crimes within the
SCSL's statute were crimes subject to universal jurisdiction.' 7 Similarly, the amnesties granted in Chile during Pinochet's regime and in
Argentina during Argentina's "dirty war" have been recently set aside,
both by courts and legislatures in those countries, as well as by courts
asked to consider them abroad.' Even governments advocating exile
15 David Wippman, Atrocities, Deterrence, and the Limits of InternationalJustice, 23
FoRDtA- INr'L L.J. 473 (1999); see also Jos6 Alvarez, Crimes of State/Crimes of Hate:
Lessons from Rwanda, 24 YALEJ. INT'L L. 365, 385-86 (1999) (criticizing, in particular,
the primacy jurisdiction of the ICTR, and arguing that "bottom-up" solutions may be
more appropriate); Evelyn Bradley, In Search forJustice-A Truth in Reconcilliation [sic]
Commission for Rwanda, 7J. INT'L L. & PAc. 129 (1998).
16 See, e.g., Sadat, supra note 12.
17 It did not, however, find the amnesty invalid per se. Prosecutor v. Kallon &
Kamara, Case Nos. SCSL-2004-15-AR72(E), SCSL-2004-16-AR72(E), Decision on Challenge to Jurisdiction: Lom6 Accord Amnesty,
87-89 (Mar. 13, 2004). This decision followed to the same effect the opinion of the ICTY in Prosecutorv. Furundzja,
Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment (Dec. 10, 1998), which was cited with approval by a
recent U.N. report on impunity, U.N. Econ & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm'n on
Human Rights, Promotion and Protectionof Human Rights: Impunity, Report of the Independent Expert To Update the Set of Principles To Combat Impunity, 48, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/
2005/102 (Feb. 18, 2005) (prepared by Diane Orentlicher) [hereinafter OrentlicherImpunity Study]. The SCSL reaffirmed Kallon and Kamara a few months later in Prosecutor v. Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-2004-14-AR72(G), Decision on Lack of Jurisdiction/
Abuse of Process: Amnesty Provided by the Lomo Accord (May 25, 2004). In
Kondewa, Justice Robertson authored a special opinion arguing that the amnesty had
become ineffective, not because of the international nature of the crimes, but because
it had been forfeited by the resurgence of the conflict. Id.
28 (separate opinion of
Judge Robertson).
18 In March of 2001, an Argentinean judge declared Argentina's amnesty laws
unconstitutional and in violation of international law, a decision confirmed in August
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initially, such as the Bush administration's offer to Saddam Hussein,
have subsequently sought accountability in the form of criminal trials

of 2003, when both houses of Argentina's Congress voted by a large majority to annul
those laws. Debora Rey, Argentina Approves Ending Laws on Amnesty, WASH. POST, Aug.
22, 2003, at A16; News Release, Human Rights Watch, Argentina: Holding Rights
Abusers Accountable (Aug. 14, 2003), http://www.hrw.org/press/2003/08/argentina081403.htm; see Amnesty Int'l, Argentina: The Full Stop and Due Obedience Laws and
International Law, Al Index AMR 13/004/2003, Apr. 1, 2003, available at http://
web.amnesty.org/library/pdf/AMR1 30042003ENGLISH/$File/AMR1300403.pdf;
Daniel W. Schwartz, Rectifying Twenty-Five Years of Material Breach: Argentina and the
Legacy of the 'Dirty War' in International Law, 18 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 317, 337-40
(2004). On June 15, 2005, The Supreme Court of Argentina held, by a vote of 7-1
(and one abstention), that Argentina's amnesty laws were unconstitutional because
they prevented Argentina from complying with obligations under international treaties, as regards jus cogens norms against forced disappearances. Supreme Court of Argentina: Case ofJulio Hfctor Simon, INT'L L. BRIEF, June 28, 2005, http://www.asil.org/
ilib/2005/06/ilib050628.htm#J1 (discussing Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], 14/
6/2005, "In re Simon, Julio Hector / recurso de hecho," No. 17.768 (Arg.), available at
http://www.clarin.com/diario/2005/06/14/um/fallopuntofinal.doc). The Supreme
Court of Argentina has also held, in a 5-3 decision, that crimes against humanity,
including genocide, torture, execution and forced disappearances, are not subject to
any statute of limitations due to their status as serious crimes under international law.
Supreme Court of Argentina:Judgment in the Case of Enrique Lautaro Arancibia Clavel
Confirming the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to Crimes Against Humanity, INT'L
L. BRIEF, Aug. 31, 2004, http://www.asil.org/ilib/ilib0715.htm#jl (discussing Corte
Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], 24/8/2004, "In re Clavel, Enrique Lautaro / recurso de
hecho," No. 259 (Arg.), available at http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/arg/doc/
arancibial.html). Similarly, courts in Chile have sidestepped Pinochet's self-granted
amnesty, permitting Pinochet and others to be indicted and, in the case of some individuals, convicted of crimes committed during the Pinochet regime. See generally
NAOMI ROHT-ARRIAZA, THE PINOCHET EFFECT: TRANSNATIONAL JUSTICE IN THE AGE OF
HUMAN RIGHTS 81 (2005);Jen Ross, Chilean Court Slaps Down Notion of Amnesty, GLOBE

& MAIL (Toronto), Nov. 19, 2004, at A19; Raquel Aldana, Steps Closer to Justice for
Past Crimes in Argentina and Chile: A Story of Judicial Boldness (Nov. 17, 2004),
http://law.case.edu/war-crimes-research-portal/instant-analysis.asp?id=1 2. Indeed,
another Chilean judge recently held that Pinochet was competent to stand trial for
abuses during his tenure in office. Larry Rohter, ChileanJudge Says Pinochet Is Fitfor
Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2004, at Al. The decision was rendered by Judge Juan
Guzmdln Tapia on December 13, 2004, and according to press reports, rendered Pinochet mentally fit to "'undergo criminal investigation in Chile in all of its stages,'"
including depositions and "'face-to-face interrogations"' about his role in the perpetration of crimes against political opponents in the 1970s while head of state. Id.
(quotingJudge Juan Guzmdn Tupia, Court of Appeals of Santiago, Chile). Pinochet's
lawyers immediately filed an injunction with the Santiago Court of Appeals that upheld the ruling ofJudge Guzmdn on December 20, 2004. Peter A. Barcroft, The Slow
Demise of Impunity in Argentina and Chile, ASIL INSIGHT, Jan. 7 2005, http://
www.asil.org/insights/2005/01/insightO5OlO7.htm.
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or other redress. 19 Most recently, the Sudanese government, many of
whose members have been accused of serious crimes under international law, has not argued that accountability is a poor idea; instead,
the government has argued that it should be able to bring prosecutions itself, rather than having the Darfur situation referred to the
International Criminal Court.
In light of these new developments in international law and practice, this Article has four goals. First, it examines recent decisions
from Argentina, Chile, Mexico, Spain, the SCSL and the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) to glean new insights into the treatment of
amnesties before both domestic and international courts, lending vital
practical evidence and experience to the logic of the law. 20 Although
other courts have issued opinions relevant to the present inquiry, the
cluster of recent cases arising out of the Latin American experience,
combined with new decisions from international courts, offer an extraordinary example of transnational legal process in which municipal
and international courts have engaged in a dialogue of international
norm creation. 2 1 These opinions suggest that amnesties are not only
increasingly unacceptable as a matter of law, but particularly as re19 The United States is currently supporting the trial of Saddam Hussein and
other former Baath party leaders in Iraq both financially and logistically. See Leila
Nadya Sadat, New Developments Regarding the Prosecution of Saddam Hussein by the Iraqi
Special Tribunal, ASIL INSIGHT, Aug. 5, 2005, http://www.asil.org/insights/2005/08/
insights05O8O5.html.
20 Cf OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (1963). This is in contrast to
earlier work that has focused either on the legality of amnesties in the abstract, see,
e.g., Roman Boed, The Effect of a Domestic Amnesty on the Ability of Foreign States To Prosecute Alleged Perpetrators of Serious Human Rights Violations, 33 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 297
(2000); Kristin Henrard, The Viability of National Amnesties in View of the IncreasingRecognition of Individual CriminalResponsibility at InternationalLaw, 8 MSU-DCL J. INT'L L.
595 (1999); Ronald C. Slye, The Legitimacy of Amnesties Under International Law and
GeneralPrinciples of Anglo-American Law: Is a Legitimate Amnesty Possible?, 43 VA. J. INT'L

L. 173 (2002), or the treatment of amnesties before particular courts, see, e.g., Darryl
Robinson, Serving the Interests ofJustice: Amnesties, Truth Commissions and the International
Criminal Court, 14 EUR. J. INT'L L. 481 (2003).
21 See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, The 1994 Roscoe Pound Lecture: TransnationalLegal
Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181 (1996); Harold Hongju Koh, TransnationalPublic Law
Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347, 2398-402 (1991); Diane F. Orentlicher, Whose Justice?
Reconciling Universal Jurisdiction with Democratic Principles, 92 GEO. L.J. 1057, 1089,
1124-25 (2004); Melissa A. Waters, MediatingNorms and Identity: The Role of Transnational Judicial Dialogue in Creating and Enforcing International Law, 93 GEO. L.J. 487
(2005); see also Anne-Marie Slaughter, Defining the Limits: UniversalJurisdictionand National Courts, in UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: NATIONAL COURTS AND THE PROSECUTION OF
SERIOUS CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
[hereinafter UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION].

168, 189 (Stephen Macedo ed., 2004)
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gards top-level perpetrators, may be socially and politically unaccept22
able as well.
In connection with this discussion, Part II briefly describes as general background the by now familiar rise of the "accountability paradigm" in international law, as well as the current challenges to this
model raised by the "peace vs. justice" debate, before turning to an
exploration of recent state and international practice governing
amnesties, 23 and some related trends regarding universal jurisdiction.
We begin our inquiry with a brief recapitulation of the Eichmann
case, 24 move to the Pinochet precedent 25 and the recent developments
involving crimes committed during the military regimes in Argentina
and Chile. Subsequently, this Part concludes with a short discussion
of the Belgian retreat from the broad law on universal jurisdiction it
adopted in 199326 and the recent Spanish decisions in the Guatemala
Genocide Case.27 The examples of Haiti and South Africa, often cited
22 Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J.
2599, 2656-57 (1997).
23 As a question of terminology, this Article confines itself to a discussion of general amnesties, and expressly considers certain forms of exile to be attempts at de
facto "transnational" amnesties. The term "amnesties," as used here, means legal enactments employed to exonerate particular individuals, or classes thereof, ex ante
from legal responsibility for the commission of otherwise criminal acts. Derived from
the Greek word amnestia, meaning forgetfulness, WEBSTER'S THIR NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED

71 (1986), the amnesty

serves to obliterate an otherwise enforceable legal norm, Fania Domb, Treatment of
War Crimes in Peace Settlements-Prosecutionor Amnesty?, 24 ISR. Y.B. ON HUM. RTS. 253,
253 (1994). Unlike pardons, which imply forgiveness of the offender and are generally particularized in nature, amnesties typically apply to groups of offenders, and
neither eradicate the offense nor the moral guilt that might be associated therewith.
Daniel T. Kobil, The Quality of Mercy Strained: Wrestlingthe PardoningPowerfrom the King,
69 TEX. L. REV. 569, 575-77 (1991).
24 Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 277 (Isr. S. Ct. 1962).
25 See infra notes 215-27 and accompanying text.
26 The 1993 Belgian Law, which covered only war crimes, was amended in 1999 to
include the possibility of universal jurisdiction over genocide and crimes against humanity. Loi du 16juin 1993 relative A la repression des infractions graves aux Conventions internationales de Genhve du 12 aofit 1949 et aux Protocoles I et II du 8juin
1977, additionnels A ces Conventions [Act of June 16, 1993 Concerning the Punishment of Grave Breaches of the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949 and Their
Additional Protocols I and II of June 18, 1997], Moniteur Belge, Aug. 5, 1993, at
17751 (Belg.), amended by and renamed to Loi du 10 f~vrier 1999 relative d la repression
des violations graves de droit international humanitaire [Act of February 10, 1999
Concerning the Punishment of Grave Breaches of International Humanitarian Law]
art. 1, Moniteur Belge, Mar. 23, 1999, at 9286 (Belg.), translated as amended in 38
I.L.M. 921 (1999) [hereinafter Amended 1993 Belgium Law].
27 Sentencia del Tribunal Supremo sobre el caso Guatemala por genocidio [Decision of the Spanish Supreme Court Concerning the Guatemala Genocide Case] STS,
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in support of amnesties will be examined, as will the recent decisions
from the SCSL, the ICJ, and the ICTY. This Part also briefly considers
the legality of amnesties under international law, and concludes that
customary international law increasingly regards amnesties for the
commission of jus cogens crimes to be illegal, particularly for the leaders who have organized and commanded the commission of atrocities.
Conversely, although states increasingly take the position that impunity for the commission of jus cogens crimes is legally, socially and politically unacceptable, the Belgian and recent Spanish examples
suggest that they are nonetheless less inclined to exercise their own
universal jurisdiction to adjudicate cases involving such crimes committed by individuals with little connection to the forum, although
just as this Article was going to press, it appeared that the Spanish
courts were once again pressing ahead with universal jurisdiction
cases. At the same time, there is a sense that just as the International
Criminal Court employs the notion of "complementarity" to properly
apportion cases between the International Criminal Court and national courts, national courts are employing filtering mechanisms to
distinguish appropriate from problematic exercises of universal jurisdiction. This suggests that as the normative structure is arguably being strengthened, political constraints may increasingly come to the
fore in other ways.
Second, this Article challenges the conventional wisdom that
"swapping justice for peace" is morally and practically acceptable. Instead, I argue that international negotiators offering exile are neither
morally nor legally justified in doing so. Indeed, although it is beguiling to imagine that offering exile to Saddam Hussein would save
thousands of lives, 28 or that the Lord's Resistance Army of Uganda
would have laid down its weapons in return for automatic immunity, 29
Feb. 25, 2003, (No. 327/2003) (Spain), translated in 42 I.L.M. 686 (2003). As this
Article was going to press, the Guatemala Genocide Case was quashed by the Spanish
Constitutional Court which held that "the principle of universal jurisdiction takes precedence over the existence or not of national interests." Spain Asserts Right To Try
Genocide Crimes Committed Abroad, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Oct. 5, 2005, available in
LEXIS, Agence France Pressee-English File [hereinafter Right To Try Genocide Crimes]
(discussing STC, Sept. 26, 2005 (No. 237/2005), available at http://www.tfibunalconstitucional.es/JC.htm).
28 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
29 Indeed, an amnesty was issued in Uganda four years ago for the members of
the Lord's Resistance Army, and others, and it is estimated that between ten and
fourteen thousand rebels received it. Over 14,000 UgandanRebels Get Amnesty, XINHUA
NEWS AGENCY, Mar. 2, 2005, available in LEXIS, World Library, Xinhua File. Nonetheless, the situation in Uganda is still so bad that the Ugandan government asked the
International Criminal Court Prosecutor to open an investigation into the commis-

NOTRE

DAME

LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 81:3

the evidence suggests the contrary: that warlords and political leaders
capable of committing human rights atrocities are not deterred by the
amnesties obtained, but emboldened. As will be discussed below, the
cases of Sierra Leone, the Former Yugoslavia, and Haiti suggest that
amnesties for top-level perpetrators imposed from above or negotiated at gunpoint do not lead to the establishment of peace-but at
best create a temporary lull in the fighting. Indeed, amnesty deals
typically foster a culture of impunity in which violence becomes the
norm, rather than the exception.
Third, building upon my earlier work in this area,3 0 I propose a

resolution of many of the conceptual lacunae that have surrounded
current discussions of amnesties in international law, focusing on
their temporal, geographic and jurisdictional effects. In this connection, it should be noted that this Article confines itself to addressing
31
the problem of amnesties for the commission of jus cogens crimes crimes covered by peremptory norms of international law 2 -which
sion of atrocities there, although some have questioned the government's motivations. Although some human rights groups and other organizations have asked the
International Criminal Court not to issue arrest warrants for fear of prolonging the
conflict, a recent report on the situation suggests that the amnesties, particularly for
child soldiers, would probably be respected by the International Criminal Court. This
would not be true of the rebel leaders (or even government officials) who might still
be targeted by the Court, which recently issued its first arrest warrants. UgandanPaper
Urges Rebel Remnants To Accept Amnesty, BBC WORLDWIDE MONITORING, Oct. 8, 2005,
available in LEXIS, World Library, BBCmir File; see also CruZENS FOR GLOBAL SOLUTIONS,

IN

UNCHARTED

WATERS:

SEEKING JUSTICE

BEFORE

THE

ATROCITIES

HAVE

STOPPED-THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT IN UGANDA AND THE DEMOCRATIC RE-

PUBLIC OF THE CONGO (2004), available at http://www.globalsolutions.org/programs/

law-justice/icc/resources/uncharted-waters.pdf.
30

LEILA NADYA SADAT, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND THE TRANSFOR-

OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: JUSTICE FOR THE NEW MILLENNIUM (2002); Leila
Nadya Sadat & S. Richard Carden, The New InternationalCriminal Court: An Uneasy
Revolution, 88 GEO.L.J. 381, 403-14 (2000); Leila Nadya Sadat, UniversalJurisdiction,
National Amnesties, and Truth Commissions: Reconciling the Irreconcilable, in UNIVERSAL
JURISDICTION, supra note 21, at 193.
31 I have specifically eschewed the somewhat cumbersome terminology-"Serious
MATION

Crimes Under International Law," PRINCETON PROJECT ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION,
THE PRINCETON PRINCIPLES ON UNVERSALJURISDICTION princ. 2 (2001) [hereinafter
PRINCETON PRINCIPLES]-often employed to describe the subset of (international)
crimes over which universal jurisdiction may presumptively be exercised by states. Because this Article addresses not only the question of amnesties in connection with the
exercise of criminal jurisdiction by states, but before international tribunals as well, it

is simpler and more consistent with the purport of the definition to be clear that
these are jus cogens crimes covered by peremptory norms of international law.
32 This idea is codified in Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, which provides that a "peremptory norm of general international law is a
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may not be set aside by conflicting municipal laws. This is why the
question of amnesties is problematic, especially before international
courts.3

3

Indeed, I argue that the legal effect of any particular grant

of amnesty or exile will be determined, in part, by the forum before
which the amnesty is invoked. In particular, the treatment of amnesties before international courts and tribunals is quite different than
their effect before domestic or municipal courts. As I have written
earlier, courts have correctly recognized (even if not explicitly) that
an adjudication of international crimes before an international court
involves the direct exercise of universal internationaljurisdiction, and
is not the same as a domestic court's exercise of universal inter-state
jurisdiction. This transformation was most clearly present in the
quasi-revolutionary jurisdictional referral mechanisms present in the
ICC Statute, which allow the Security Council to apply, in a manner
unbounded by geography and state sovereignty, the substantive criminal law in the Court's Statute. 34 The same idea was recognized by the
ICJ in the Yerodia case,3 5 by the ICTY in the Furundzija case,3 6 and
most recently by the Special Court for Sierra Leone. All three opinions recognized the impossibility of effectively invoking an immunity
created by national law before an international tribunal. However,
none of the opinions satisfactorily explain why. Part I addresses this
doctrinal puzzle, and argues that these opinions correctly reflect the
current "constitutional" status of international criminal law normsnorms that are, and have been since at least the Nuremberg trials,
norms that may prime national laws and render them inoperative
under certain conditions.
Finally, having set out the evidentiary lessons from state and international practice, as well as the applicable theoretical and doctrinal
foundations, I combine theory and practice (Part III) and address the
status of domestic, transnational and international amnesties before
national and international courts. I distinguish between "domestic"
norm accepted and recognized by the international community of states as a whole as
a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a
subsequent norm of general international law having the same character." Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
33 1 must emphasize that it is problematic only as regards jus cogens crimes. Corruption, looting, tax fraud, general venality or criminality are clearly crimes not
within this category.
34 The terminology is my own. See Sadat & Carden, supra note 30.
35 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 1 (Feb.
14), availableat http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iCOBE/icobejudgment/icobe
-ijudgment_20020214.PDF.
36 Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment (Dec. 10, 1998).
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(granted as a matter of municipal law by the territorial state) and
"transnational" amnesties (generally de facto amnesty received by individuals upon the condition that they leave the territorial state and
take up residence elsewhere) .3 In each case, the question raised is
whether a particular amnesty is effective in the territorial state (where
the offenses were committed), in a custodial state (where the "accused" may be found), or before an international court or tribunal.
While both theory and practice dovetail nicely on the consideration of
domestic and transnational amnesties before both state and international courts, the question whether the international community itself, whether by treaty or an act of the Security Council, may amnesty
crimes so that even the territorial state is deprived of jurisdiction is a
very difficult one, a complete treatment of which is beyond the scope
of this Article, but which is briefly considered in Part III.C. This question has become of particular importance given the recent practice of
the Security Council in exempting U.S. nationals, in particular, from
the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, as well as the territorial jurisdiction of states receiving U.N. missions.
With regard to domestic amnesties, although effective in the state
where granted, their effectiveness clearly diminishes with time. As regards a custodial state, I propose that courts in that jurisdiction should
treat the amnesty as presumptively invalid; a presumption that can be
overcome if the state granting the amnesty in question did so pursuant to a process that did not undermine the quest for accountability as
a whole. 38 The same is true in reverse for transnational amnesties,
which have no effect in the territorial state, but may at least temporarily protect an accused so long as he remains in exile. Any third state,
however, would not be bound by the grant of asylum in the state of
exile. Drawing from both U.S. and European practice, Part III.A.2
asks, somewhat facetiously, but entirely plausibly, whether international law needs an Erie doctrine, or at least some manner of systematically addressing the treatment of international law in municipal
courts.

37 It may be objected that exiling a leader and his retinue is not tantamount to
issuing a domestic amnesty-for in many instances, no legal action has led to the
individual's removal from his country of residence to his home in exile. While this is
true, nonetheless, just as an amnesty may place the individual juridically outside the
purview of the law, even if he continues to reside in his country of origin, exile places
him physically outside the reach of the law. That is why, for purposes of evaluating its
effect, exile granted to a leader that is accused of committing jus cogens offenses can
be considered as a "transnational" amnesty.
38 The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission comes to mind.
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This Article concludes that the limited and recent efforts to revive
the practice of exile and amnesty, particularly for high-level accused,
are inconsistent with crystallizing or already existent international law
norms, as opposed to evidence of a change in state practice as regards
the ultimate legality of amnesties. 39 Even where amnesties or exile
appear initially to have taken effect successfully, that effect appears to
wane with time, leading to calls for prosecution years, or even decades, after the initial crimes were committed. This, in turn, suggests
that whatever practical effect the initial grants of exile or amnesties
may have, delayed litigation and prosecution appear to be the norm,
not the exception. Perhaps even more importantly, they appear to
collide with evolving social and political norms that condemn the
grant of impunity for the commission of atrocities as unacceptable. It
is important, however, to emphasize that the international community
and states tend to differentiate between the grant of amnesties to
those most responsible for the commission of atrocities, who are held
most responsible, and lower level perpetrators. Creative solutions,
such as those experimented with in South Africa and Rwanda may be
necessary to avoid an "impunity gap" whereby senior leadership may
be prosecuted and lower level perpetrators left untouched.
Finally, and perhaps controversially, this Article contends that although international criminal justice is currently tainted by a lack of
evenhandedness that has a certain imperialist tinge, the unfairness is
39 Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27),
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/icases/inus/inus-ijudgment/inus ijudgment_19860627.pdf. Several countries have recently attempted to amnesty rebel
fighters in the hope of ending a civil war or insurgency. These include Afghanistan,
Algeria, Colombia, Indonesia and Iraq. The Afghan, Indonesian and Iraqi amnesties
appear for the most part to be largely outside the scope of this Article, for they address a primarily political situation whereby rebel fighters (whether Iraqi insurgent,
former Taliban member or Aceh rebel) may accept an amnesty offer as part of ending
a civil war, as anticipated by Article 6(5) of Protocol II, discussed infra notes 311-16
and accompanying text. The Algerian amnesty, in contrast, has been highly controversial as it provides that the state and state agents may not be held responsible for the
atrocities committed during Algeria's civil war, and was drafted without participation
by the public or other government agencies. Michael Slackman, Algerian Leaders Prefer
Amnesia to Accountabilityfor War Deeds, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2005, at Al. Colombia has
offered demobilized rebels a pardon, provided there are no charges pending against
them, and for those accused of crimes against humanity, the Colombian "Justice and
Peace Law" provides that individuals giving a voluntary account of their crimes and
who disgorge illegally acquired goods may receive a lesser sentence. Human rights
groups argue that this may permit paramilitaries being recycled back into the conflict,
but supporters argue that if the law is rigorously administered, it will achieve both
peace and justice. Colombia: Between Peace andJustice, ECONOMIST, July 23, 2005, at 33,
33.
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largely due to the failure of Western governments to submit themselves and their leaders to the rule of law rather than the decision to
pursue justice and accountability in any particular case. Moreover,
the assumption that international negotiators have a moral or legal
right to negotiate away the rights of victims and survivors by exchanging justice for peace is deeply problematic, particularly in light of the
unacceptable nature such a tradeoff would represent if the victims
were their own citizens. Thus although respect for indigenous
processes through the principles of complementarity and subsidiarity
is vital if the international justice system is to retain its credibility, accountability imposed in a sensitive, situation specific, and principled
manner is a fundamental cornerstone of any anti-impunity campaign.
I.

CRIMINAL AccoUNTABILITY FOR THE VIOLATION OF JUs COGENS
NoRMs UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW: DOCTRINAL FOUNDATIONS

A.

Jus Cogens Crimes Under InternationalLaw

Many discussions of amnesties avoid the question of the legal status of the crimes in question. Yet one cannot discuss the matter without at least determining in advance which international crimes are so
uniformly accepted by the international community that both the exercise of universal jurisdiction by states, as well as the exercise of universal jurisdiction by the international community as a whole, are
generally accepted. Although the theory of jus cogens has been the
subject of much dispute and scholarly commentary, 40 the near-universal acceptance of the notion of peremptory or jus cogens norms4 1 as set
out in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 42 suggests that
modern international criminal law, both explicitly and implicitly, embodies within its prescriptions certain nonderogable norms of peremptory application. 43 Although not all international criminal law
40

See, e.g.,
Anthony D'Amato, It's a Bird, It's a Plane, It's Jus Cogens, 6 CONN. J.
1 (1990); Gennady M. Danilenko, InternationalJusCogens: Issues of Law-Making, 2 EuR. J. INT'L L. 42 (1991).
INT'L L.

41

See, e.g.,
Alain Pellet, InternationalizedCourts:Better Than Nothing.

in Interna-

tionalized Criminal Courts: Sierra Leone, East Timor, Kosovo, and Cambodia 437,
444 (Cesare P.R. Romano et al. eds., 2004) (stating that all states, "even ... France,"

accept the notion of peremptory norms of international law).
42 Vienna Convention, supra note 32.
43 In its report on what became Article 53 of the Vienna Convention, the International Law Commission gave as examples of treaties that would violate a peremptory
norm of international law a treaty contemplating an unlawful use of force, a treaty
contemplating an act criminal under international law, and a treaty conniving or contemplating slave trading, piracy or genocide. The Commission also mentioned as possibilities treaties violating human rights, the equality of states and the principle of self-
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scholars address the question of peremptory norms (indeed, the concept does not even figure in the otherwise excellent monograph of
Antonio Cassese 44 ), fundamental to the notion of a duty to prosecute
international crimes, a duty incumbent upon all states, is the nonderogability of the norms at issue. 45 Indeed, the very reason amnesties are
so deeply problematic is that they fly in the face of this fundamental
tenet of international law and practice. This may be why not one jurisdiction has, to date, accepted the juridical validity of a foreign amnesty decree for the commission of human rights atrocities. As the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia opined in
Prosecutor v. Furundzija,4 6 regarding the crime of torture,
While the erga omnes nature [of the crime] appertains to the
area of international enforcement (lato sensu), the other major feature of the principle proscribing torture relates to the hierarchy of
rules in the international normative order. Because of the importance of the values it protects, this principle has evolved into a peremptory norm or jus cogens, that is, a norm that enjoys a higher rank
in the international hierarchy than treaty law and even "ordinary"
47
customary rules.
Even if one agrees, however, on the status of jus cogens crimes in
principle, determining which offenses are entitled to that status is
problematic. The report issued by the Secretary-General establishing
the ICTY, although avoiding the term jus cogens, took the view that the
most serious crimes against the international community as a whole
included rules of international humanitarian law that are "beyond any
doubt" part of customary international law. 48 Examples include war
determination.

Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 21

U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 9), U.N. Doc. A/6309/Rev.1 (1966), reprintedin [1966] 2 Y.B.
Int'l L. Comm'n 169, 248, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/Ser.A/1966/Add.1.
44 See ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (2003).
45 Accord M. Cherif Bassiouni, UniversalJurisdictionfor InternationalCrimes: Historical Perspectives and Contemporary Practice, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 81, 104 (2001); Henrard,
supra note 20, at 645; Natalino Ronzitti, Use of Force, Jus Cogens and State Consent, in
THE CURRENT LEGAL REGULATION OF THE USE OF FORCE 147 (A. Cassese ed., 1986); cf
Claudia Annacker, The Legal RPgime of Erga Omnes Obligations in InternationalLaw, 46
AUSTRIAN J. PUB. & INT'L L. 131, 135 (1994).

46 Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment (Dec. 10, 1998).
47 Id. 153. It is true that this holding is arguably dicta. See William Schabas,
Commentary on Prosecutor v. Furundzija, in 3 ANNOTATED LEADING CASES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS 753, 755 (Andre Klip & G6ran Sluiter eds., 1999).
48 The Secretary-General's report does not use the terminology "jus cogens," but
instead refers to "rules of international humanitarian law which are beyond any doubt
part of customary law so that the problem of adherence of some but not all States to
specific conventions does not arise." The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph2 of Security Council Resolution 808,

34, U.N. Doc. S/25704
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crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity. 49 The draft Chicago
50
Principles on Post-ConflictJustice retain the same category of offenses.
The Princeton Principles categorize these as "serious" crimes under international law, adding to the list piracy, slavery, crimes against peace,
and torture. 5 1 The International Law Commission, in its 1996 Draft
Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, included aggression, genocide, crimes against humanity, crimes against United Nations and associated personnel, and war crimes.5 2 Finally, the
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States, relying on several U.S. cases, 53 takes the position that universal
jurisdiction crimes (which I would label jus cogens offenses, as detailed
below 54 ) include piracy, the slave trade, attacks on or highjackings of
55
aircraft, genocide, war crimes, and perhaps certain acts of terrorism.
The Restatement's omission of aggression and torture is perhaps
problematic given the relatively widespread acceptance of these
crimes (and may simply be a function of the fact that it is almost
twenty years old). Conversely, its addition of terrorism as a jus cogens
(May 3, 1993) [hereinafter Secretay-General's Report]. The Secretary-General concluded that these rules included
the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 for the Protection of War Victims; the Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War
on Land and the Regulations annexed thereto of 18 October 1907; the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 9
December 1948; and the Charter of the International Military Tribunal [Nuremberg Charter] of 8 August 1945.
Id. 1 34-35 (footnotes omitted).
49

Id.

50

INT'L HUMAN RIGHTS LAW INST., CHICAGO PRINCIPLES ON POST-CONFLICT JUSTICE princ. 10 (forthcoming 2005), available at http://www.yorku.ca/remedies/Papers/PCJ%20Principles.%2011.05.03.DOC.
51 PRINCETON PRINCIPLES, supra note 31, princ. 2(1).
52 Report of the International Law Commission to General Assembly, 51 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 10) arts. 16-20, at 83-120, U.N. Doc. A/51/10 (1996), reprintedin [1996]
2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 1, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1996/Add.1 (Part 2).
53 See, e.g., Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 714-19
(9th Cir. 1992) (holding that alleged acts of official torture, which were committed in
Argentina before the adoption of the Torture Convention, violated international law
under which the prohibition of official torture had acquired the status of jus cogens);
United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1991); In re Extradition of Demjanjuk,
603 F. Supp. 1468, 1473-79 (N.D. Ohio 1985) (holding that offenses that are jus
cogens may be punished by any state because the offenders are the common enemies
of all mankind and all nations have an equal interest in their apprehension and
prosecution).

54

See infra text accompanying note 65.

55

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 404 (1986).
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offense may be appropriate, particularly after the Security Council
Resolutions issued following the attacks of September 11, 2001, particularly Resolution 1373.56 Among other things, the Resolution,
adopted pursuant to Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, 57 provides that
all states have a duty to enact legislation criminalizing certain acts of
terrorism, 58 suggesting that amnesties, either de facto or de jure, for
such crimes would contravene international law. Indeed, Resolution
1373 suggests that these are crimes over which the exercise of universal jurisdiction would be appropriate, and even mandatory, as a matter
of customary international law. 59
Bassiouni suggests that three considerations are primary when
asking whether a particular international legal rule has reached the
status of a peremptory norm: the historical evolution of the crime, the
number of states that have incorporated the crime into their national
laws, and the number of international and national prosecutions for
the crime in question and how they have been characterized. 60 Also
important, in his view, are international court decisions and scholarly
writings of the most distinguished publicists. 61 Most commentators,
including Bassiouni, appear to view jus cogens norms, paradoxically, as
representing a floor, a set of lowest common denominator provisions
truly fundamental to the international legal order, yet representing
56
57
58

S.C. Res. 1373,
1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001).
U.N. Charter ch. VII.
S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 56,
2(e). According to the Princeton Principles,
terrorism is not a crime of universal jurisdiction. See PRINCETON PRINCIPLES, Supra
note 31, princ. 2(1). However, Resolution 1373 "decides" that every state must punish
and prevent terrorism, suggesting that it is the Security Council's belief that this crime
is now a crime for which universal jurisdiction exists and for which a duty to punish is
present. S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 56,
1-2. Therefore, in the Security Council's
view, presumably any amnesties granted to terrorists would be illegal.
59 See Leila Nadya Sadat, Terrorism and the Rule of Law, 3 WASH. U. GLOBAL STun.
L. REv. 135, 150 (2004). Of course, given that the Security Council presumably has
no power to create international law, the question remains whether Security Council
Resolution 1373 is the codification of custom or a new form of Security Council "legislation." See generally Paul C. Szasz, Comment, The Security Council Starts Legislating, 96
AM. J. INT'L. L. 901 (2002).
60 M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 174
(2003).
61 Id. at 174-75. It is probable that Bassiouni's list is incomplete. Although some
writers question the notion of jus cogens entirely, as opposed to the notion of an international legal order based on state consent, Bassiouni's perspective is perhaps too
conservative, taking only those prohibitions that are without a doubt nearly universally accepted as constituting peremptory norms. Hilary Charlesworth & Christine
Chinkin, The Gender ofJus Cogens, 15 HuM. RTS. Q. 63, 75 (1993) (arguing that the
prohibitions "in" and "out" of the list of peremptory norms do not appear to address
equally the problems of men and women).
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norms of a superior hierarchical status in the international legal system. Thus, like constitutional norms, they may embody an aspirational as well as a prescriptive quality. 62 Most authorities examining

the question have concluded that the list of jus cogens crimes under
international law includes genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, crimes against peace (aggression), torture, piracy and slavery
and slave-related practices. 6 3 There are important indicators that terrorism, including attacks against aircraft and aircraft hijacking, is also
an emerging jus cogens crime, both as indicated by state 64 and international practice, as discussed above. Thus, this Article includes terrorist
acts in considering, in particular, the normative desirability of amnesties at the international and municipal levels.
B.

DistinguishingUniversal Inter-State Jurisdictionfrom Universal
International Jurisdiction

Because this Article addresses the question of amnesties only as
regards jus cogens crimes, and makes the further assumption, like the
Princeton Principles and other authorities, that the set of jus cogens
crimes is coterminous with the set of crimes over which states may
exercise universal jurisdiction, 65 a discussion of amnesties and interna62 See Charlesworth & Chinkin, supra note 61, at 65, 75. In the future, as more
explicit discussions of the constitutional order of the international community occur,
the notion of peremptory norms may be more fully explored and indeed expanded to
include protections for other important human rights. Id. at 75-76.
63 BASSIOUNI, supra note 60, at 172; PRINCETON PRINCIPLES, supra note 31, princ.
2(1). The 1997 Joinet Report does not list the crimes that must be prosecuted, but
simply refers to them as "serious crimes under international law." U.N. Econ. & Soc.
Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm. on Prevention of Discrimination & Prot. of Minorities, The Administration ofJustice and the Human Rights of Detainees: Question of the Impunity of Perpetratorsof Human Rights Violations (Civil and Political), 31, U.N. Doc. E/
CN.4/Sub.2/1997/20/Rev.1 (Oct. 2, 1997) (prepared by Louis Joinet) [hereinafter
Joinet Report].
64 See, e.g., infra Part II.B.1-2 (discussing terrorism as a jus cogens offense in Spanish law); see also United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
65 Obviously, there are contrary views that have been expressed about the set of
"universal jurisdiction crimes." See, for example, the separate opinion of President
Guillaume in the Yerodia case, where he stated categorically that "international law
knows only one true case of universal jurisdiction: piracy." Arrest Warrant of 11 April
2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Beig.), 2002 I.C.J. 1,
12 (Feb. 14) (separate opinion of
President Guillaume), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iCOBE/
icobejudgment/icobejjudgment_20020214_guillaume.PDF. Moreover, even in cases
where universal jurisdiction is accepted in principle regarding certain crimes, a court
may nevertheless refuse the exercise of universal jurisdiction in a particular case as a
matter of comity or for lack of resources. Cf Guatemala Genocide Case, STS, Feb. 25,
2003, (No. 327/2003) (Spain), translated in 42 I.L.M. 686, 702-03 (2003).
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tional law necessarily entails consideration of the exercise of universal
jurisdiction by states and by the international community as a whole,
about which I shall say more in a moment.
States exist in a horizontal relationship to one another. Their
jurisdiction to prescribe norms of criminal law is territorially
bounded, except insofar as some exception permitting the extraterritorial exercise of a state's prescriptive or adjudicative jurisdiction is
present. As the Lotus case 6 6 suggests, both in the views of the major67
ity
as well as the dissent,68 under the Westphalian system, the prescriptive and adjudicative jurisdiction of sovereign states is a creation
of international law. Moreover, states generally have jurisdiction only
over their territories, with the caveat that international law has generally recognized four exceptions to territoriality: jurisdiction based on
nationality, passive personality, the protective principle, and the principle of universality. Application of universal jurisdiction is predicated largely on the notion that some crimes are so heinous that they
offend the interest of all humanity, and, indeed, imperil civilization
itself.69 States seeking to exercise universal jurisdiction over the per-

petrator of a jus cogens crime are therefore employing their own legislative authority to prescribe as regards an international law norm.
Deciding when and under what conditions states may exercise universal jurisdiction, even in light of an amnesty, or some other immunity
imparted by municipal or international law, therefore, presents what I
have referred to in earlier writings as a problem of universal "inter70
state" jurisdiction.
The situation before an international court or tribunal, however,
is quite different. The vertical relationship between international and
national law, and least as regards jus cogens crimes, extant as a function
of the basic principles of international law, is quite different from the
horizontal perspective apparent in cases of universal inter-state jurisdiction. As the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg declared, "[I]ndividuals have international duties which transcend the

66 S.S. "Lotus" (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7), available at
http://www.icj-cij .org/cijwww/cdecisions/ccpij/serieA/Al 0/30-LotusArret.pdf.
67

Id. at 18-19.

68
69

Id. at 43-44 (dissenting opinion of Vice-President Weiss).
See Luc REYDAms, UNvERSaJuRISDic-riON 38-42 (2003); Kenneth C. Randall,

UniversalJurisdiction Under InternationalLaw, 66 TEX. L. REV. 785, 803 (1988); see also

Orentlicher, supra note 21, at 1059-60, 1063.
70 Sadat & Carden, supra note 30, at 406; Leila Nadya Sadat, Redefining Universal
Jurisdiction,35 NEw ENG. L. REv. 241, 244 (2001).

976

NOTRE

DAME

LAW

REVIEW

[VOL.

81:3

71
national obligations of obedience imposed by the individual state.
Standing alone, of course, this statement neither created a rule or custom, nor, importantly, did it imply that international courts necessarily have primacy over national courts, although the Tribunal itself
asserted that its adjudicative power was based upon the fact that the
signatories to the London Charter were merely "do[ing] together
what any one of them might have done singly."72 Instead, what this
statement suggests is that international law (as a matter of prescriptive
content) may sometimes prime national law, and that international
courts may, in appropriate circumstances, exercise adjudicative jurisdiction in questions involving international legal obligations. It was
many years before the notion that international law primed national
law in certain circumstances became firmly aligned with the idea that
international courts should have primacy over national jurisdictions as
well-at least under certain circumstances-and indeed, one of the
fundamental contributions of the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court was to help clarify and codify the status of international, as opposed to national, jurisdictions exercising adjudicative jurisdiction over jus cogens crimes.
Although some commentators have argued that international
courts, whether created by the Security Council or by international
treaty (or by amendment to the Charter) are courts exercising jurisdiction delegated to them by states, either directly or through the intermediary of the Charter, 73 this argument is probably overstated.
Indeed, to accept such a proposition would stand the nature of the
international legal order on its head, given that the jurisdictions of
states, wrapped up as they are in the essence and definition of sovereignty, are in fact the creation of international law. At the very least,
this claim appears insufficient to explain the establishment of the
ICTY, ICTR, and ICC, nor does it seem consistent with their jurisdictional bases. As the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY held in Prosecutorv.
Blaskic,7 4 the grant of authority to the ICTY by the U.N. Security Council created a vertical relationship between the ICTY and states, not
only as to the international law involved, but with regard to the 'judicial and injunctory powers" of the ICTY. 75 The Appeals Chamber

71 International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment and Sentences, Oct.
1, 1946, reprinted in 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 172, 221 (1947).
72 Id. at 216.
73 E.g., Madeline Morris, High Crimes and Misconceptions: The ICC and Non-Party
States, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 2001, at 13, 18, 52-57.
74 Case No. IT-95-14, Judgment on the Request of the Republic of Croatia for
Review of the Decision of Trial Chamber II of 18 July 1997 (Oct. 29, 1997).
75 Id. 1 47.
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noted the continued dependence of international courts upon states
and the Security Council in the realm of enforcement jurisdiction, a
dependency continued and perhaps even exacerbated with the establishment of the International Criminal Court and the very "soft" enforcement regime built into the ICC's Statute. 76 Moreover, as the
Tribual noted, state sovereignty is the principle organizing premise of
the world's legal order. However, to the extent that national and international legal orders, each autonomous in their own right, exist in
a mutually reinforcing, even symbiotic relationship, it would seem
deeply problematic to argue that states alone are the ultimate repositories of the international community's prescriptive and adjudicative
jurisdictional capacities. Rather, as European scholars suggested during the post-war period, the international community may assert jurisdiction over a problem if it affects a fundamental interest of the
77
international community or l'ordre public internationaL

The crimes under consideration in this Article "shock the conscience of humanity. ' 78 The Preamble to the Rome Statute suggests
that these crimes threaten two separate sets of core values: the value of
community and the value of peace, security and public order. 79 Embodied in this conceptualization is the notion of a world or global
community in which the peoples of the world are united by "common
bonds" whose cultures are pieced together like the tiles in a "delicate
mosaic."8 0 Implicit in the metaphor of the mosaic is the notion that if
tiles are removed from the picture, the image captured therein may
no longer be recognizable-that humanity will become crippled, shattered and even destroyed through the elimination of its separate components. The idea of the mosaic also suggests that if some of the tiles
are removed, others will be loosened, leading eventually to the degradation of the whole. For this reason, impunity for the perpetrators of
the crimes in the ICC's statute is an important component not only of
punishment, but of prevention.
It is perhaps bold to speak of the international legal order as having a constitutional or quasi-constitutional structure. However, it is
increasingly obvious that such is the case, although it is much less
clear what is included in the text of the "Global Constitution," and
what principles govern the repartition of competences between na76

Sadat & Carden, supra note 30, at 415-17.

77 E.g., Georges Levasseur, Les crimes contre l'humanitM et leprobMe de leur prescription, 93J. DROIT INTERNATIONAL 259, 267 (1966) (Fr.).

78

Rome Statute, supra note 13, pmbl.

79

Id.; see also

CUSTOMARY

80

THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS

LAW (1989).

Rome Statute, supra note 13, pmbl.
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tional and the international legal orders.8 1 As Laurence Helfer recently noted, the "constitutionalization" of the European Union's
constitutive treaties by the European Court of Justice has spilled over
to the general international legal order, and heavily influenced both
82
the theory and practice of international constitutionalism generally.
Certainly, the U.N. Charter is central to the fundamental structure of
international law, as are basic norms such as pacta sunt servanda. The
development of norms prohibiting the commission of jus cogens
crimes has evolved out of a sense of urgency-the sense, as will be
explored below, that the crimes under consideration represent such
an extraordinary threat to human society that turning a blind eye to
their prevention and punishment is a luxury that modern society can
no longer afford. While some scholars critique the notion of a
"global" or "international" community, it is difficult to ignore the rise
of an element of universalism and internationality in current international discourse, elements that can conveniently, even if not entirely
accurately, be lumped together and described as an "international
community." After all, the idea of a world community is not a new
one, having been espoused at least as early by the Stoics,8 3 and the
current proliferation of international courts and tribunals with jurisdiction over a myriad of international questions-including trade, the
law of the sea, territorial and boundary disputes, international investment, and international human rights-suggests a high level of transnational dialogue on myriad issues, including the problem of
international criminality. As crimes against humanity, war crimes, and
perhaps genocide, continue in the Sudan, 8 4 grotesque acts of terrorism are carried out against citizens of the United States, and conflict
continues in the Middle East, Africa and parts of Asia, the international community has sought to establish legal norms condemning
state violence and the commission of human rights atrocities, and to

81 See, e.g., Bardo Fassbender, The United Nations Charteras Constitution of the International Community, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 529 (1998).
82 Laurence R. Heifer, ConstitutionalAnalogies in the InternationalLegal System, 37
Loy. L.A. L. REV. 193, 199-200 (2003). Interestingly, even opponents of some new
international institutions make reference in their writings to a "global constitution,"
suggesting that its presence, if not its content, is undeniable. See, e.g., Lee A. Casey &
David B. Rivkin, Jr., The Limits of Legitimacy: The Rome Statute's Unlawful Application to
Non-State Parties, 44 VA.J. INT'L L. 63, 64 (2003).
83

See generally Walter Schiffer, The Legal Community of Mankind (1954).

84 Int'l Comm'n of Inquiry on Darfur, Report of the InternationalCommission of Inquiy on Darfur delivered to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/2005/60/Annex (Feb. 1,

2005).
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create institutions and legal regimes to enforce those norms.8 5 A
more complete discussion of those developments follows.
II.

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE AS TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL
PROCESS:

A.

Two

STEPS FORWARD, ONE STEP BACK?

Establishing an InternationalSystem of CriminalJustice

1. Historical Evolution
Although it would no doubt be preferable for the international
community to prevent atrocities before they occur, 86 the world has
neither the resources nor the will to do so consistently. Instead,just as
domestic legal systems attempt to constrain violent behavior by relying
upon the internalization of norms by individuals rather than the continual threat of external sanctions, the international community has
sought to engage in norm building as well, with the possibility of sanctions at the domestic level conceived of as the "stick" required. This
was evidenced by the adoption of international legal instruments such
as the Torture Convention, 87 the Genocide Convention, 88 the
Apartheid Convention, 9 and the four Geneva Conventions of 1949,90
85

Although it was once argued that bringing war crimes prosecutions would ex-

acerbate, rather than help resolve, ethnic conflict, and that argument continues to
have some currency, it is now more commonly accepted that accountability is more
likely to promote positive effects than impunity. See Leila Sadat Wexler, The Proposed
Permanent International Criminal Court: An Appraisal 29 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 665, 672
(1996).
86 W. Michael Reisman, Legal Responses to Genocide and Other Massive Violations of
Human Rights, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1996, at 75, 75. But see Payam
Akhavan, Justice and Reconciliation in the Great Lakes Region of Africa: The Contribution of
the International Criminal Tribunalfor Rwanda, 7 DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 325, 328

(1997) (arguing that because cataclysmic violence requires extensive planning

it

is

both foreseeable and preventable).

87

Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treat-

ment or Punishment, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY Doc. No. 100-20
(1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force on June 26, 1987) [hereinafter Torture
Convention].
88 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
opened for signatureDec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force
Jan. 12, 1951) [hereinafter Genocide Convention].
89 International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of
Apartheid, opened for signature Nov. 30, 1973, 1015 U.N.T.S. 243.
90 Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75
U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Geneva Convention I]; Convention for the Amelioration of
the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at
Sea, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter
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that required parties to the treaties to criminalize their breach, or at
least certain breaches of the treaties' provisions. These treaties notwithstanding, however, impunity for the commission of human rights
atrocities was the norm, rather than the exception, for decades. In
the 1970s, this began to change with the establishment of an international campaign to end impunity for the commission of human rights
abuses at the hands of dictators, particularly in Latin America. 9 1
In the 1990s, the U.N. Commission on Human Rights took up the
question of impunity in a focused way, based upon an important report authored by Special Rapporteur LouisJoinet in 1997.92 In the report, Joinet identified four stages characterizing the international
campaign against impunity.9 3 The first was a grassroots campaign in
the 1970s mobilizing pro-democracy movements, NGOs, and legal experts, to obtain amnesty for political prisoners in countries such as
Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay. 94 During the second stage, in the
1980s, the notion of amnesty came to be seen as a "kind of 'insurance
on impunity' with the emergence, then proliferation, of 'self-amnesty'
laws proclaimed by declining military dictatorships anxious to arrange
their own impunity. '9 5 These "self-amnesties" were vigorously contested in Latin America by victims groups such as the Mothers of the
Plaza de Mayo and the Latin American Federation of Associations of
Relatives of Disappeared Detainees. 96 Finally, the third and fourth
stages followed the fall of the Berlin Wall, an event that precipitated a
Geneva Convention II]; Convention Relative to the Treatment for Prisoners of War,
opened for signatureAug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva
Convention III]; Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, opened for signatureAug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter
Geneva Convention IV].
91 Some scholars argued that states have a duty to prosecute such offenders
under customary international law, or at least to ensure their prosecution. M. CHERIF
BAssiouNI

& EDWARD

DuTY To EXTRAnIT OR
20-25 (1995); Orentlicher, supra note 11, at

M. WIsE, AUT DEDERE AUTJUDcARE: THE

PROSECUTE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

2547-49.
92 Joinet Report, supra note 63.
93 The report defined impunity as
the impossibility, dejure or de facto, of bringing the perpetrators of human
rights violations to account-whether in criminal, civil, administrative, or
disciplinary proceedings-since they are not subject to any inquiry that
might lead to their being accused, arrested, tried and, if found guilty, sentenced to appropriate penalties, and to making reparations to to their

victims.
Id. annex II, at 17.
94 Id. 2.
95 Id. 3.
96 Id.
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new wave of democratization, and a new regard for the international
norms and institutions adopted or called for in the immediate aftermath of World War 11. 9 7 A push for justice, combined with a belief in
the rule of law, was initiated by national and international actors, and
a general consensus was reached that the grant of "amnesty for the
perpetrators of serious human rights violations was incompatible with
the right of every individual to a fair hearing before an impartial and
independent court."9 8 The principles adopted in the Joinet Report
have been highly influential in both state and international practice,
and, according to the most recent U.N. expert report on impunity,
submitted by Professor Diane Orentlicher, have been influential not
only in the jurisprudence of the supervisory bodies for the American
Convention on Human Rights, 99 but in national legal systems as
well. 100

Both the Joinet and Orentlicherreports identify three elements essential for combating impunity: a right of the victims to know what
happened to them and their countrymen, which has both an individual and a collective dimension, a right to justice (including a fair and
effective remedy), and the right to reparations. 10 1 Although neither
identify criminal prosecutions as the sine qua non of the anti-impunity
campaign, there is no doubt that they, as well as victims' groups
around the world,10 2 have identified as a cornerstone of the effort to
combat impunity the traditional framework of the criminal law, i.e.,
the condemnation of certain behavior as criminal,not simply a breach

Id. 1 4-5.
98 Id. 5 (referring to a ruling of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, see
infta notes 237-42 and accompanying text; World Conference on Human Rights,
97

June 14-25, 1993, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action,
CONF.157/23 (July 12, 1993)).

99
100

Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.

101

Joinet Report, supra note 63,

OrentlicherImpunity Study, supra note 17,

1

1

1

91, U.N. Doc. A/

70.

16-43; Orentlicher Impunity Study, supra note 17,

1 17-69.
102 The campaign against impunity has been largely driven not from the top
down, as some have suggested, but from grassroots efforts by global civil society, including victims' groups, around the world. To name just one example, the Coalition
for the International Criminal Court now has more than 2000 organizational members from around the world. COAL. FOR THE INT'L CRIMINAL COURT, FACTSHEET: AN
OVERVIEW OF THE ICC AND THE CICC 1 (2006), http://www.iccnow.org/documents/
CICCFS_Overview_3Jan06.pdf. These organizations represent many sectors of global
civil society, including victims' fights, human fights, women's and children's rights,
humanitarian law and religious organizations.
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of treaty or customary international law obligations, requiring the im10 3
position of individual criminal responsibility.
Constructing an international criminal justice system from the
ground up has been an arduous endeavor, lacking the logical perfection one might wish to see in the establishment of a new legal order.
Nevertheless, the international community, frustrated with the inability of civil sanctions, military reprisals, and the doctrine of State Responsibility to deter atrocities,10 4 has increasingly moved toward a
criminal model that treats the commission of atrocities as unacceptably disruptive behavior for which individual offenders must be tried
and punished. 10 5 The impetus for the construction of an international criminal justice system has been a joint effort of governments,
NGOs, victims' groups and survivors, and the system envisaged has
always viewed the recourse to international law and enforcement as a
last, rather than first, resort.
Modern theories of criminal justice generally justify punishment
either on the basis of the benefit society can expect to receive through
deterrence of other criminals or rehabilitation or incapacitation of
the offender (utilitarian theory), or because the criminal "deserves"
punishment for the injury he has inflicted on society (retributive justice).106 Both utilitarian and retributive aspirations are found in international criminal justice, although, of course, standard criminal
justice models were developed in the context of individual behavior
attacking norms established by the state and not, as is so often the case
in international crimes, in the context of normatively unacceptable
behavior committed by the state. Certainly it is hoped, although not
103 This criminalization has also come largely from grassroots movements in particular countries. Thus, when Argentina's Parliament repealed two amnesty laws in
August of 2003, opening the way for the prosecution of military leaders alleged to be
responsible for the death and disappearance of thousands of individuals during Argentina's "dirty war," victim's rights groups clapped and chanted, "'The impunity is
going to end! Justice will prevail!'" Argentine Mothers Rejoice at Repeal of Amnesty Laws,
CHI. TRIB., Aug. 22, 2003, § 1, at 7.
104 Leila Nadya Sadat, The Establishment of the InternationalCriminal Court: From the
Hague to Rome and Back Again, 8J. INT'L L. & PRAc. 97, 102-07 (1999).
105 See Theodor Meron, Is International Law Moving Towards Criminalization?, 9
EUR. J. INT'L

L. 18, 30 (1998).

106 Leila Sadat Wexler, Reflections on the Trial of Vichy CollaboratorPaul Touvier for
Crimes Against Humanity in France, 20 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 191, 210 (1995). Retributive
justice has many variants, as wonderfully explained in Joshua Dressier, Hating
Criminals: How Can Something That Feels So Good Be Wrong?, 88 MICH. L. REv. 1448,
1451-53 (1990) (reviewing JEFFRIE G. MuRPHY & JEAN HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND

(1998)). For a critique of modern retributive theory, see David Dolinko, Three
Mistakes of Retributivism, 39 UCLA L. REv. 1623 (1992).
MERCY
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yet empirically demonstrable, that erecting a system of international
criminal justice (including national and international prosecutions)
will prevent the reoccurrence of war crimes and human rights atrocities. I0 7 The criminal justice apparatus is also designed to ensure respect for the rule of law as a value in and of itself.1 08 In addition,
there is no doubt that by employing the criminal law--the most coercive form of power generally available to a society to regulate social
behavior-the international community (and its component states) is
constructing a normative discourse expressing deep condemnation of
the behavior, as well as support for its victims.
Finally, by channeling accountability and punishment through an
official mechanism, society hopes to avoid individual vigilantism, and
to provide an impartial forum where individuals accused of crimes
during a prior regime may have their cases heard, with all the due
process rights necessary to ensure that their treatment is not tantamount to a vendetta or purge. 10 9 That is, to be seen as legitimate, the
offenders must receive all the benefits of due process and legality they
denied their victims.' 10 Public trials occurring in courts using rules of
evidence and formalized procedures are invested with a solemnity and
transparency often absent from other venues. It is hoped this will provide a forum not only for the punishment of a particular defendant,
but also an arena in which the victims may be heard and an "official"
version of the truth recorded.1 1 1 In the best case scenario, victims and
survivors might even receive an apology from their tormentors, leading not only to the reestablishment of social order, but to individual
healing. A case in point is the Bosnian Serb government, which, fol107 Stanley Cohen, State Crimes of Previous Regimes: Knowledge, Accountability, and the
Policing of the Past, 20 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 7, 22 (1995).
108 Indeed, "the idea that wrongs should be redressed, that reparation should be
made to the injured, is among the most venerable and most central of legal principles." Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Punishment, Redress and Pardon: Theoretical and Psychological
Approaches, in IMPUNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRAcICE 13,
17 (Naomi Roht-Arriaza ed., 1995).
109 Purges have been another traditional response of societies in transition, and
are sometimes a necessary element of a comprehensive package. They can result in
human rights abuses, however, and many societies have seen a "quick, decisive purge
of enthusiastic collaborators" as an alternative to criminal trials. Osiel, supra note 11,
at 133. In post-War Europe they were common; the purge in France itself resulted in
as many as 40,000 extrajudicial executions. Sadat Wexler, supranote 106, at 197 n.34.
110 Cohen, supra note 107, at 22. For a critique of this position, suggesting that
many safeguards afforded to defendants in national courts should not be extrapolated
to the international arena, see Farer, supra note 14, at 92-98.
111 For a superb treatment of many of the issues surrounding the use of criminal
trials following mass atrocities, see MARK OSIEL, MAss ATROcITY, COLLECTIVE MEMORY,
AND THE LAW (1997).

NOTRE DAME

LAW

REVIEW

[VOL. 81:3

lowing the Krstic'12 decision in the ICTY, finally apologized to the Bosnian Muslim community for the wartime massacre at Srbrenica,
during which more than 8000 Bosnian Muslim males were killed in
113
one of the worst instances of ethnic cleansing during the war.
The criminal law, of course, is not the only element of the campaign against impunity, as both the Joinet and Orentlicher reports underscore. An additional component is knowledge. Beginning in the
1970s, many countries in transition established truth commissions as a
transitional justice mechanism that would concentrate on the overall
pattern of abuses that occurred under a prior regime rather than on
acts of individual criminality. Although truth commissions may be followed by amnesties, 114 they may also, at least in theory, facilitate accountability by serving as precursors to the adoption of measures
including reparations, restitution, civil remedies, lustration laws and
even criminal prosecutions. 15 In fact, the report of the National Convention on Truth and Reconciliation was critical to establishing many
of the facts relied upon by Judge Garz6n in the case brought against
General Pinochet in Spain,' 16 and the 1997 Impunity Guidelines state
that the "right to know" is an essential element in preventing impunity
117
for the commission of serious crimes under international law.
Truth commissions may "often reduc[e] tension and increas[e] na-

112 Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33, Judgment (Apr. 19, 2004).
113 For the view that remorse and apology are central to the criminal arena, and
should be more explicitly taken into consideration in the criminal law, see Stephanos
Bibas & Richard A. Bierschbach, IntegratingRemorse and Apology into CriminalProcedure,
114 YALE L.J. 101 (2005).
114 Much of the literature posits truth commissions as alternatives to prosecutions.
John Dugard, Reconciliation andJustice: The South African Experience, 8 TRANSNAT'L L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 277, 287 (1998). But the question of whether to establish a truth
commission is separate from the issue of whether any or all of the regimes' former
leaders (or lower level offenders) will ultimately be prosecuted.
115 On the other hand, accountability measures and truth commissions may exist
in a difficult relationship to each other, as the recent squabble between the Sierra
Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission (SLTC) and the Special Court for Sierra Leone suggests. Indeed, according to recent accounts, the SLTC has suggested
that the Special Court's decision not to respect the amnesty in the Lomb Accord at
least as to the accused before it, may be destabilizing to the country. Hans Nichols,
Truth ChallengesJustice in Freetown, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2005, at A15. But see William
A. Schabas, A Synergistic Relationship: The Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Special Courtfor Sierra Leone, 15 CriM. L.F. 3 (2004).
116 Chandra Lekha Sriram, Exercising UniversalJurisdiction: Contemporary Disparate
Practice, 6 INT'LJ. HUM. RTs., Winter 2002, at 49, 53 (2002).
117 SeeJoinet Report, supra note 63, annex II, princ. 1, at 17.
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tional reconciliation,"' 1 8 or serve as a therapeutic and powerful form
of restorative justice," I9 permitting victims to narrate the account of
their victimization without the cumbersome baggage and ritualized
procedures of the criminal trial. 120 On the other hand, there is always
the danger that the establishment of a truth commission, without
more, may derail the quest for accountability if it has been established
by an unrepentant government to manipulate public perceptions either at home or abroad, or simply as part of an effort to whitewash
2
past atrocities.' '
Against this background, the decision of the South African government to establish a truth and reconciliation commission was
118 Priscilla B. Hayner, Fifteen Truth Commissions-1974 to 1994: A Comparative
Study, 16 HUM. RTS. Q. 597, 610 (1994); see also Peter A. Schey et al., Addressing Human
Rights Abuses: Truth Commissions and the Value of Amnesty, 19 WHITrIER L. REv. 325, 337
(1997).
119 Cohen, supra note 107, at 15. As Professor Cohen notes, the truth phase of
social transitions "is an onslaught on all [the] forms of denial-personal and collective, the conscious coverup and the convenient forgetting, the euphemistic renaming.
This process can be as painful as its common metaphors imply: digging up graves,
opening wounds." Id.
120 Elizabeth Kiss, Moral Ambition Within and Beyond Political Constraints:Reflections
on Restorative Justice, in TRUTH V. JUSTICE 68, 71-74 (Robert I. Rotberg & Dennis
Thompson eds., 2000).
121 This was the case with the first truth commission established by Idi Amin in
Uganda in 1974, which was established partly as a result of international pressure.
Hayner, supra note 118, at 608. The Commission, which was known as the "Commission of Inquiry into Disappearances of People in Uganda," held public hearings into
disappearances that occurred under the Amin government, and issued a report which
President Amin refused to publish. Id. at 611-12. Indeed, the four commissioners
who comprised the Commission were targeted by the state for reprisals, and one was
ultimately executed on trumped-up murder charges. Id. at 612. A second, and better
known, truth commission was established in Uganda in 1986, which, although more
active than the first commission, was beset with financial and logistical problems. 2
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE:

How

EMERGING DEMOCRACIES

RECKON WITH FORMER REGIMES

513-31 (NeilJ. Kritz ed., 1995). The report was issued in 1994, and has received little
attention, as most copies are apparently languishing in Ugandan warehouses. Neil J.
Kritz, Coming to Terms with Atrocities: A Review of Accountability Mechanisms for Mass Violations of Human Rights, 59 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1996, at 127, 142. The
same could be said, to a lesser degree, of the truth commission established in Chad in
1990. The U.N. Impunity Guidelines proposed a set of principles for the conduct of
truth commissions that would set a minimum internationally acceptable standard for
their operation. See JoinetReport, supra note 63, annex II. Although early experiences
with truth commissions suggested that "prosecutions are very rare after a truth commission report," Hayner, supra note 118, at 604, the current practice in Argentina,
South Africa and Sierra Leone appears to underscore that truth commissions and
prosecutions may occur either sequentially or simultaneously, see, e.g., id. at 614-15,
625, 632 (discussing practices in Argentina and South Africa).
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viewed with interest by the international community. Unlike many
earlier truth commissions, the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was unique because it was established by a
democratically-elected legislature that included representatives of
apartheid's victims and was not simply a matter of executive (or international) fiat. 122 There were extensive debates during this process between those who favored, at one extreme, blanket amnesties, and
those who were opposed to amnesties of any kind. 123 The TRC 124 attempted to forge a compromise between these two extremes. 125 Of
the 7112 amnesty applications that the Amnesty Committee of the
Commission received, 849 were granted and 5392 were rejected.1 26
Alleged perpetrators who did not come forward remain open to civil

122 On the South African experience generally, see RIcHARD J. GOLDSTONE, FOR
HuMANrrY: REFLECTIONS OF A WAR CRIMES INVESTIGATOR 59-73 (2000); Dugard, supra
note 114; Jeremy Sarkin, The Trials and Tribulationsof South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 12 S. AlR. J. HuM. RTS. 617 (1996); Schey et al., supra note 118;
Justin M. Schwartz, South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission: A Functional
Equivalent to Prosecution, 3 DEPAUL DIG. INT'L L. 13 (1997). As part of a negotiated
settlement with the leaders of the apartheid regime, the 1993 Interim Constitution for
the Republic of South Africa called for amnesty to be granted "in respect of acts,
omissions and offences associated with political objectives and committed in the
course of the conflicts of the past." S. AFR. (Interim) CONST. 1993, postamble.
123 Dugard, supra note 114, at 279; Sarkin, supra note 122, at 620. Interestingly,
prior to the political transition that finally occurred, it had been contemplated that
the leaders of the apartheid regime would be tried either by an international criminal
court, A la Nuremberg, or in states to which they might flee. Thus, the Apartheid
Convention criminalized apartheid as a crime and provided for the trial of offenders
either by States Parties to the Convention or an international tribunal. Dugard,
supra note 114, at 290.
124 Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995 (S. Afr.), available at http://www.doj.gov.za/trc/legal/act9534.htm.
125 Dugard, supra note 114, at 292. South Africa looked to Chile as a model both
as to what to avoid and what mechanisms might be successful as regards a truth commission. Richard Goldstone, Past Human Rights Violations: Truth Commissions and
Amnesties or Prosecutions,51 N. IR. LEGAL Q. 164, 166-67 (2000). Pursuant to the Truth
and Reconciliation Commission Act, amnesties may be granted only if the act, omission or offence was committed with a political objective, in the course of the conflicts
of the past. Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act s. 20(1)(b). Moreover, the applicant for amnesty must make full disclosure of all relevant facts. Id.
§ 20(1)(c).
126 Truth & Reconciliation Comm'n, Summary of Amnesty Decisions (Nov. 1,
2000), http://www.doj.gov.za/trc/amntrans/index.htm. The South African Truth
and Reconciliation Commission has now concluded its work. Statistics on the amnesties granted, as well as transcripts of the proceedings, may be found at the Commission's website. Id.
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suits and criminal prosecutions.1 27 Because the process became
"judicialized" due to concerns about the due process rights of those
named as alleged perpetrators, the TRC's hearings and amnesty applications came "to resemble criminal trials, with both victims or their
families and the alleged perpetrators of human rights violations represented by lawyers determined to drag out the examination and crossexamination of witnesses."1 28 An examination of public discussions of
the Commission's work and the scholarly response to the amnesties
granted by the Commission suggest that reactions have been
mixed. 129 Nonetheless, the South African experience suggests that in
some cases, carefully focused amnesty provisions, combined with the
threat of prosecutions, may be both normatively and legally accept1 30
able means to promote transitional justice.
2.

The Steady Erosion of Realpolitik

Both amnesties and exile are typically offered up as practical, if
31
somewhat unsatisfactory solutions to the problem of mass atrocities. 1
127

The difficulty of obtaining evidence suitable for prosecutions is often cited as

another factor supporting the South African solution. As others have noted, the
South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission is quite different than virtually
all other commissions in its effort to establish mechanisms of accountability in the
face of severe political constraints. Kiss, supra note 120, at 76.
128 Dugard, supra note 114, at 298. The TRC issued its report to President Nelson
Mandela on October 29, 1998. Kurt Shillinger, South Africa Faces Up to a "Horrendous
Past," BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 30, 1998, at Al (including a timeline of events).
129 The failure of former President Pieter W. Botha and many former cabinet ministers and military officers to appear was disappointing, as was the acquittal of the
former Minister of Defense, Magnus Malan, and his generals for murder arising from
the KwaMakutha massacre. Moreover, most of those applying for amnesty were relatively low-level perpetrators, as opposed to high government officials. Schey et al.,
supranote 118, at 328. Recent scandals involving a pardon of thirty-three prisoners by
President Thabo Mbeki suggest that the ultimate success of the TRC is not yet assured. Andrew Maykuth, Apartheid Aftermath: Presidential Pardons Ignite Political

Firestorm, SEATTLE

TIMES,

July 24, 2002, at A3.

130 There is some recent evidence that truth commissions, like trials, do not work
well unless local conditions are taken into consideration. A recent study on the Sierra
Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission suggests that in some parts of Sierra
Leone the public was very divided about the Commission, and noted that in several
communities people collectively agreed not to give statements. ROSALIND SHAW, U.S.
INSTITUTION OF PEACE, RETHINKING

TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSIONS:

130 (2005),

LES-

available at http://www.usip.org/pubs/
specialreports/srl 30.pdf. For a generally positive assessment of the SLTC and its relationship to the Special Court, see Schabas, supra note 115, at 3.
131 For the view that state sovereignty is the principle obstacle to the enforcement
of international humanitarian law, see Antonio Cassese, Reflections on International
CriminalJustice, 61 MoD. L. REv. 1 (1998).
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Justice is traded for peace, or at least a temporary truce, in the hopes
that the atrocities will stop and the society will be able to move on.
Domestically, two principal justifications have been advanced for offering blanket amnesties for human rights violations committed by a
regime against its citizens. First, dictators and military leaders have
1 32
often demanded impunity as a condition of relinquishing power.
In response, societies eager to end a conflict and fearful of repercussions from attempts to pursue accountability may shy away from criminal trials or other proceedings to hold responsible those accused of
1 33
committing human rights violations in the former regime.
Second, even if a new regime is committed to prosecuting past
international crimes, it may face considerable logistical obstacles in
doing so. Rwanda is a case in point. During the Rwandan genocide of
1994, Rwanda's justice system was completely eviscerated.1 3 4 Rwanda
attempted to address the problem by adopting a law (under which the
offenders would be punished) that effectuated a four-part triage of
offenses, ranging from the most serious1 3 5 to the least egregious (defendants who had committed crimes against property).1 3 6 The law
also provided for a "confession and guilty plea procedure" that would
permit offenders in the second, third and fourth categories to obtain
132 See Michael P. Scharf, The Amnesty Exception to the Jurisdictionof the International
Criminal Court, 32 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 507, 509 (1999) (arguing that civilian rule was
restored to Haiti because the members of the military regime that had been accused
of massive human rights abuses received amnesty for their crimes pursuant to the
Governors Island Agreement negotiated in July 1993 under international auspices).
But see Irwin P. Stotzky, Haiti: SearchingforAliernatives,in IMPUNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACrICE, supra note 108, at 185, 189-91 (stating that the
"Governors Island Agreement was a total failure. Neither C~dras [the military leader]
nor Fran4ois resigned. Instead, Cdras broke every part of the brokered deal and
employed every kind of delay while subordinates known as attaches continued to terrorize the population," and the only way the military leaders were ousted was the
threat of invasion by the United States, which ultimately sent U.S. troops to Haiti
under an agreement that also required Ctdras and Franiois to leave their posts and
receive amnesty for their crimes).
133 Hayner, supra note 118, at 609.
134 More than eighty percent of Rwanda's judges and magistrates were killed or
disappeared, and the system faced extraordinary infrastructure challenges. See, e.g.,
Bradley, supra note 15, at 130.
135 Category one offenders include "organizers or planners of the genocide, persons in positions of authority ... and 'notorious murderers who by virtue of the zeal
or excessive malice with which they committed atrocities, distinguished themselves'
and persons who committed 'acts of sexual torture.'" Id. at 134 (quoting Organic
Law of August 30, 1996 on the Organization of Prosecutions for Offenses Constituting
the Crime of Genocide or Crimes Against Humanity Committed Since October 1,
1990, No. 08/96, art. 2 (Rwanda) [hereinafter Organic Law]).
136 Id.
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significant reductions in penalties in exchange for a full confession. 137
Unfortunately, the sheer numbers of prisoners involved (estimated to
be more than 100,000 at times), and the influence that the ggnocidaires
continue to exert over the prison population, 13 8 rendered the confession and guilt procedures ineffective, and the trials that did occur
under the new law were often criticized as unfair. 139 In such a case, as
a practical matter, imposing individual criminal responsibility appears
to be a difficult strategy. 140 At the same time, releasing the detainees
and admitting the impossibility of the task could have led to further
14 1
outbreaks of violence and degradation of the rule of law.
In July 1999, Rwanda responded by creating "Gacaca Tribunals,"
comprised of ordinary citizens who will hear cases involving category
two, three and four offenses under the Genocide Law. 14 2 Under Gacaca, suspects are brought before nineteen-member lay tribunals sitting in the village where the crimes occurred. 43 Anyone can speak
for or against those charged, and the accused may confess and seek
forgiveness or deny the charges and defend themselves. 14 4 The accused is not protected by many of the rights normally available to
criminal defendants, however, leading some international observers to
137 William A. Schabas, Justice, Democracy, and Impunity in Post-Genocide Rwanda:
Searchingfor Solutions to Impossible Problems, 7 CRIM. L.F. 523, 538 (1996) (citing Or-

ganic Law arts. 4-16).
138 If true, it is arguable that Rwanda would be worse off if it released prisoners
still under the influence of the g6nocidaires.
139 Defendants often had little or no access to legal counsel during critical periods
of the investigation or trial, trials were unduly rapid and conducted in an atmosphere
hostile to the defendants, and the trials often resulted in death sentences that were

expeditiously carried out.

MARTHA MINOw, FACING HISTORY AFTER GENOCIDE AND

124-25 (1998); Bradley, supra note 15, at 144-45.
140 Dugard suggests an alternative reason that criminal prosecutions may be
thwarted following a transition to democracy: sufficient evidence may simply be unavailable to support a criminal conviction, given that the repressive regime in question may quite probably have operated under a shroud of secrecy that makes
information gathering after the fact quite difficult. He suggests South Africa as a case
in point. Dugard, supra note 114, at 286.
141 Schabas, supra note 137, at 547-48. Avoiding some of these difficulties is one
reason the establishment of an international criminal tribunal for Rwanda appeared
desirable. The Security Council resolution establishing the Tribunal expressly suggests that international cooperation will "strengthen the courts and judicial systems of
Rwanda, having regard in particular to the necessity for those courts to deal with large
numbers of suspects." S.C. Res. 955, at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994).
MASS VIOLENCE

142
BRIEF,

Leah Werchick, Prospectsfor Justice in Rwanda's Citizen Tribunals, 8 HUM. RTS.
Spring 2001, at 15, 15, available at http://www.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/

hrbrief083.pdf.
143
144

Id.
Id.
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express concern about the ultimate fairness of the result. 145 Morever,
according to at least one report, discussion is forbidden about
whether the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF)-the now-leading political party-committed atrocities during and after the genocide, 146 sug1 47
gesting a lack of impartiality.

Although Rwanda's pursuit of the Gacaca process 148 suggests the
continued importance of accountability and justice to Rwandan society, at least some Rwandan observers have expressed concern that perpetrators coming forward to confess may in fact not feel that what they
did was wrong: in the chilling assessment of one Rwandan, "they believe that the real crime is not what they did, but is not to confess what
they did."1 49 If so, there is probably little doubt that maintaining pressure on the Rwandese government and the now out of power Hutu
majority is still an important component of maintaining a stable peace
in Rwanda.
Yet it is not only individual states that are tempted by amnesties,
but the international community as well. International negotiators eager to bring about a settlement in hopes of ending a bloody conflict,
or assuring that their own state's interests are protected in any political transitions that occur abroad, will often ignore calls for justice,
arguing that the "policies and practices of accommodation in the pur145 Id. at 16-17. The procedure departs considerably from the traditional Gacaca
model, which was developed to handle property or marital disputes, not criminal trials or genocide. Id. at 17.
146 Abraham McLaughlin, Rwanda Bucks Blind Obedience, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
Apr. 9, 2004, at 6.
147 The ICTR has also avoided the question whether or not the RPF was engaged
in the commission of atrocities. On August 28, 2003, the Security Council voted
unanimously to split the job of Chief War Crimes Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte over the
objections of the Chief Prosecutor herself. S.C. Res. 1503, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1503
(Aug. 28, 2003). Although it may well have been true that Del Ponte was stretched
too thin, what appears to have finally brought matters to a head was that Del Ponte
had been attempting to indict Tutsis for massacres committed by RPF forces during
and immediately after the genocide. This angered Rwanda's President Paul Kagame,
who consistently complained to the Security Council and Secretary-General Kofi Annan about Del Ponte's performance and tried to obstruct the ICTR each time it endeavored to investigate the crimes. Declan Walsh, Turning a Blind Eye to Increasingly
Dictatorial Ways of Rwanda's Leader, IRISH TIMES, Aug. 27, 2003, at 14; see also The
Rwandan Genocide Tribunal: Did Carla Del Ponte Do too Little or too Much in Rwanda?

Both,
148

ECONOMIST,

Aug. 23, 2003, at 38.

Sudarsan Raghavan, Rwanda PreparesTo Use Tribunalsfor Genocide but Community

Courts Ill-Prepared,SAN JOSE

MERCURY NEWS,

June 20, 2002, at 9A.

149 Gerald Gahima, Former Procurator-General, Republic of Rwanda, Remarks at
the International Conference on Accountability for Atrocities (July 16, 2004) (notes
on file with author).
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suit of political settlement conflict with legal accountability in the pursuit of retributive and restorative justice."1 50 The Dayton Accords
were negotiated with Slobodan Milosevic, in spite of expert opinion
and substantial evidence that implicated him in the ethnic cleansing
in the former Yugoslavia. 15 1 Similarly, the international community
negotiated with Foday Sankoh to try to bring about a settlement in the
Sierra Leone conflict. 152 In both cases, the peace agreements negotiated were followed by renewed attacks against civilians as Milosevic
153
and Sankoh resumed their bloody campaigns.
Haiti is often cited as a successful example of "swapping amnesty
for peace."' 154 But its recent travails suggest that political amnesties,
particularly when imposed from above, rather than democratically
adopted from within, may cause a country already struggling with democracy and human rights to slip further into chaos, rather than
enter a period of stability and tranquility. At the very least, there is
very little evidence that the amnesty granted in the case of Haiti was of
any real assistance in bringing to an end the human rights atrocities
committed during the conflict in the 1990s. Of course, Haiti has been
150 M. Cherif Bassiouni, Combating Impunityfor InternationalCrimes, 71 U. COLO. L.
REv. 409, 409 (2000).

151

For a discussion of the Dayton negotiations, see GARYJONATHAN BAss, STAY THE
237-46 (photo. reprint 2002) (2000). As Bass notes, although it

HAND OF VENGEANCE

was possibly true that the Dayton Accords would not have been possible without
Milosevic's assistance, they also "would not have been necessary" in the first place. Id.
at 246. Indeed, one expert recently suggested that the ICTY's failure to indict
Milosevic for crimes he allegedly committed in Bosnia emboldened him to commit
additional crimes in Kosovo. Paul Williams, Professor of Int'l Serv., Am. Univ. Wash.
Coll. of Law, Remarks at American University Washington College of Law: The International Criminal Court and American National Security (Sept. 14, 2000) (notes on
file with author). In 2000, it was reported that the United States was exploring offering immunity to Milosevic in return for his relinquishing power in the Former Yugoslavia. Steven Erlanger, An Effort To Ease Milosevic's Exit, INT'L HERALD TRIB. (Paris),
June 19, 2000, at 1.
152 See Peace Agreement Between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, July 7, 1999, U.N. Doc. S/1999/777/Annex
(July 12, 1999) [hereinafter Lom4 Agreement].
153 Both leaders were subsequently indicted and Milosevic was on trial before the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia before his recent death.
Sankoh was arraigned for murder before a national court in Freetown and would have
been tried before the Special Court for Sierra Leone. Sierra Leone: Caged but Unlikely
To Hang, ECONOMIST, Mar. 23, 2002, at 45. However, he died while awaiting trial.
Somini Sengupta, African Heldfor War Crimes Dies in Custody of a Tribunal, N.Y. TIMES,
July 31, 2003, at A6.
154 Michael P. Scharf, Swapping Amnesty for Peace: Was There a Duty To ProsecuteInternational Crimes in Haiti?, 31 TEX. INT'L L.J. 1 (1996).
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"small, poor, and badly governed" for most of its 200-year history. 155
Yet, in 1990, it was hoped that the country had perhaps turned the
corner when a populist Catholic priest named Jean-Bertrand Aristide
was elected President with an overwhelming sixty-seven percent of the
total vote.156 Aristide ran on a platform of politically, socially, and
economically empowering the country's poor, as well as one of institutional and military reform. 157 Aristide's reformist ideas, however, angered the country's economic elite, its military, and its smugglers, and
he was overthrown in a military coup in 1991.158

Although the United States called for Aristide's reinstatement,
U.S. policy toward Aristide was clearly ambivalent as his populist lean159
ings were viewed as a threat to U.S. financial and strategic interests.
Three years of military rule followed Aristide's removal, years that
were characterized by gross and systematic violations of human rights.
It has been estimated that 3000 to 5000 people were murdered by
right-wing death squads during this time period.1 60 Desperate attempts to control the flow of refugees from Haiti and the rampaging
of the military government ensued, culminating finally in the negotiation of the Governors Island Agreement with the regime in July
1993.161 The Agreement promised the return of constitutional rule in
exchange for amnesty for the coup leaders.1 6 2 Unfortunately, not
only did the primary beneficiaries renege on the agreement, leading
ultimately to Haiti's invasion by foreign military forces, 163 but the am155

ROBERT

I.

ROTBERG, HAITI'S

TURMOIL: POLITICS AND POLICY UNDER ARISTIDE

1 (2003). According to the U.N. Development Programme, Haiti is the
poorest country in the Western Hemisphere. U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, HuMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2004, at 142, available at http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2004/
pdf/hdr04_complete.pdf (placing Haiti at 153rd out of 177 countries in the world,
with the worst performance in Latin America).
156 Morris Morley & Chris McGillion, "Disobedient" Generals and the Politics of
Redemocratization: The Clinton Administration and Haiti, 112 POL. Scl. Q. 363, 364
(1997).
157 Id.
158 ROTBERG, supra note 155, at 1; see also Int'l Crisis Group, A New Chance for
Haiti?, ICG Latin America/Caribbean Report No. 10 (Nov. 18, 2004) [hereinafter
ICG Haiti Report]; ROBERT FATTON, JR., HAITI'S PREDATORY REPUBLIC: THE UNENDING
TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY (2002).
159 Morley & McGillion, supra note 156, at 364-66.
160 ICG Haiti Report, supra note 158, at 4.
161 The Secretary-General, The Situtation of Democracy and the Human Rights in Haiti,
5, delivered to the Security Council and the GeneralAssembly, U.N. Doc. S/26063, A/47/
975 (July 12, 1993) (reproducing text of Governors Island Agreement, July 3, 1993).
AND CLINTON

162 Id.
163 In July 1994, the U.N. Security Council authorized the invasion of Haiti by a
U.S. led multinational force to "use all necessary means" to facilitate the military lead-
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nesty that was granted appears to have helped destabilize the country,
at least in the view of some experts. 64 Rather than use the considerable external support he received from the United States and the U.N.,
Aristide, who had inspired so much hope in the impoverished people
of Haiti, "came to resemble the opportunist politician who has de165
fined much of the country's history."
In 2000, Aristide won an overwhelming majority in elections
widely viewed both by international observers and Haitians themselves
as illegitimate,' 16 6 and violence, corruption, protests and strikes
erupted in Haiti. This resulted in an extraordinary political crisis and
armed insurgency in 2004, ultimately resulting in Aristide's resigna67
tion and departure from Haiti under mysterious circumstances.
Aristide left in a U.S. chartered plane for the Central African Republic
on February 29, 2004, and now resides in exile in South Africa. Although he continues to maintain that he is still the democratically
elected President of the country, the international community has rejected that assertion. Some observers have suggested that the amnesties may have sent the wrong signal to Aristide and his supporters, 68
and today Haiti remains impoverished, with little prospects of improvement so long as the rebels continue to dream of an armed comeback. 169 Ultimately, the Haitian example suggests that "swapping
amnesty for peace," while no doubt tempting to international negotiators looking for leverage, may lead to increased violence and future
destabilization.
3.

Amnesty, Imperialism and Deterrence: Some Normative
Concerns

The critique is sometimes offered that the notion of an international criminal justice system is a Western one, insensitive to Eastern,
Islamic or other non-Western sensibilities. However, modern writers
on the subject correctly point to Chinese, Islamic and Hindu traditions that underscore the universal values enshrined in the prohibiership's departure from Haiti and restoration of the legitimate government. See S.C.
Res. 940, 1 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/940 (July 31, 1994).
164 ICG Haiti Report, supra note 158, at 5.
165 Peter Dailey, Haiti: The Fall of the House of Aristide, N.Y. REv. BooKs, Mar. 13,
2003, at 41, 47; see also Ian Martin, Haiti:InternationalForce of National Compromise?, 31

J.

LATIN AMER. STUD.

711, 730 (1999).

166 ICG Haiti Report, supra note 158, at 8. The ICG estimates that only five to ten
percent of the population voted in the elections. Id.
167 Id. at 9-11.
168 Id. at 5.
169 After the Fal, ECONOMIST, Apr. 24, 2004, at 36, 36-37.
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tion of jus cogens crimes that shock the conscience of humankind. 170
Unlike human rights law, which has a comprehensive agenda, international criminal law, at least as regards jus cogens crimes, limits its concern, for the most part, to "the most serious crimes of concern to the
international community as a whole,"'17 1 avoiding perhaps some of the
difficulties human rights lawyers face when they argue universality in
the face of national legal rules challenging the international standards
asserted.
What is probably a fair critique, however, is that the enforcement of
international criminal law depends upon a combination of force and
political power, and is often influenced by the foreign policy agenda
of powerful states. Just as rich and powerful citizens may dominate a
national legal system, wealthy and powerful countries such as the
United States may not only influence which cases are brought, but
perhaps even more problematically, may refuse to permit the application of international criminal law to themselves and their nationals,
even when insisting it should be applied to others. This is evinced by
the Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal which permits an Iraqi Court
(originally established under U.S. occupation) to exercise jurisdiction
over Saddam Hussein and his associates for violations of international
humanitarian law and gross violations of human rights, but deprives it
of jurisdiction over U.S. soldiers or civilians accused of mistreating
Iraqi detainees in Iraqi prisons such as Abu Ghraib.1 72 Clearly, the
presence of this kind of double standard in the application of legal
rules decreases the legitimacy of the entire endeavor; but it would be a
mistake to confuse the tu quoque defense with a principle ofjustice. As
Justice Robert Jackson argued in his opening statement at Nuremberg, those credibly accused of the commission of human rights atrocities may be "hard pressed" if called to account before the bar of
'1 7 3
justice, but they are certainly not "ill-used.
Similarly, imperialism often taints the argument that one should
"trade justice for peace" in order to end a conflict quickly. While it
may be correct that in some highly exceptional cases, exile or amnesty
170 See, e.g., BASSIOUNI, supra note 60, 25-29.
171 Rome Statute, supra note 13, pmbl.
172 See, e.g., Leila Nadya Sadat, InternationalLegal Issues Surroundingthe Mistreatment
of Iraqi Detainees by American Forces, ASIL INSIGHT, May 2004, available at http://
www.asil.org/insights/insighl34.htm. Another example is presented by the Security
Council Resolution referring the Darfur situation in the Sudan to the ICC, which
although referring the nationals of Sudan, a nonparty state, to the ICC, contains language exempting persons from other nonparty states from the ICC's jurisdiction.
S.C. Res. 1593, 1 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005).
173

ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE NORNBERG CASE 34 (1971).
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will serve both the long and short term interests of peace, the exception easily becomes the rule, with highly corrosive effects on the rule
of law, as well as international peace and security. Just as David Luban
has recently exploded the fallacy of the "ticking bomb" scenario generally used to justify the practice of torture by liberal states, 174 we
should be wary of facile assertions that failing to grant war criminals
amnesty in a "naive" pursuit of justice will lead to terrible consequences, including the deaths of thousands of innocent victims.
In the context of state torture, Luban argues that relaxing the
prohibition on torture leads not to the exceptional heroic effort to
save hundreds of lives, but in fact serves as the predicate for the establishment of a "torture culture" in which torture becomes not the exception, but the rule. 175 He notes that the ticking bomb scenario,
which posits that it may be sometimes necessary to torture an individual in order to defuse a ticking bomb and thereby save hundreds
more, places the prohibitionist in a terrible position both rhetorically
and dialectically, because he has been forced by the example to
choose between his adherence to principle (opposition to torture)
and saving hundreds of fellow human beings. 176 Yet the hypothetical
does not represent the world as it really is. The "ticking bomb scenario" is predicated on three facts rarely found in the real world: first,
that law enforcement agents know in advance of a plot capable of being thwarted; second, that they are certain of the perpetrator's identity;
and, finally, that torture is likely to evoke the information needed to thwart

the plot and save the hundreds of lives being dangled in front of the
prohibitionist to make him admit that in this case he would accept the
practice of torture.1 77 Because these conditions are rarely found in
reality, Luban argues that admitting the morality and legality of torture in fact leads not to heroic and exceptional acts of torture by law
enforcement agents saving lives, but to a mentality that permits torture to become institutionalized as a practice by governments willing
to accept it.178
Similarly, the theory that justice should sometimes be traded for
peace seduces, although the parallels between the two constructs are
not identical, of course. Take the Saddam Hussein example, invoked
above. Implicit in the challenge to those who insist on bringing Saddam to justice are three assumptions: first, that the departure of Sad174

David J. Luban, Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking Bomb, 91 VA. L. REv. 1425

(2005).
175
176
177

Id. at 1441, 1452-60.
Id. at 1440-41.
Id. at 1442.

178

Id.at 1445-52.
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dam from Iraq would have stopped a U.S. invasion of Iraq, a
proposition that seems completely unlikely (and even extraordinarily
cynical) given the U.S. insistence on removing Iraq's alleged weapons
of mass destruction; second, the idea that once out of the country,
Saddam would cease his criminal activities and lead a quiet life, posing
no danger to anyone; finally, that U.S. negotiators are morally, legally
and practically justified in determining whether or not thousands of
Iraqis are killed in a war launched by the United States itself.
Regarding the last point, particularly in respect of any moral
claim that the United States might make in trading Iraqi justice for a
U.S. peace, imagine if General Musharef of Pakistan offered Osama
bin Laden amnesty in exchange for a promise that he would cease and
desist his terrorist activitiesI 7 9 -would the families of those killed in

the terrorist attacks of September 11 feel that General Musharef had
any moral or legal right to trade their justice for peace? Even if by
doing so, it could be argued that future lives would be saved once bin
Laden had stopped his terrorist activities? Two different challenges,
at least, might be raised to such a proposition, the first being that we
would not trust Osama to honor the agreement; the second that such
an agreement could embolden other would-be terrorists by setting an
example of impunity. Indeed, if amnesty is generally an unacceptable
proposition in cases of jus cogens crimes committed against U.S. nationals (although once again, it might be important to distinguish be-

tween lower level perpetrators and their leaders), it is not clear why it
would be acceptable for amnesties to be granted to individuals who
have "merely" victimized their own countrymen and women, unless, of
course the country in question decided upon remedies uniquely
suited to its particular circumstances.
The Saddam Hussein example invoked in this Article, is, of
course, atypical. The more usual scenario is one in which warlords or
political leaders insist upon amnesty as a condition of ceasing their
criminal behavior. Yet at this juncture, only South Africa can be
evoked as an example of a successful transition to democratic and
peaceful rule accompanied by the grant of amnesties, and in fact, this
appears to be because of the unique leadership, historical circumstances, and ultimately the particularized consideration of individual
cases that accompanied the truth and reconciliation commission pro-

179 This may not be too farfetched of a hypothetical case. See, e.g., Hassan M.
Fattah, Bin Laden Warns of Attacks on the US., INr'L HERALD TRIB. (Paris), Jan. 20,
2006, at 1 (reporting that the A] Qaeda leader offered a truce which Washington
rejected out of hand).
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cess. 180 Moreover, the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission process was accompanied by prosecutions and only uneasily
accepted by many of apartheid's worst victims. 18 1 In addition to the
constitutional challenges brought against the amnesty laws, the families of many of those who were tortured and killed have objected to
amnesty proceedings for the perpetrators of those who victimized
their loved ones.1 82 That is not to say that truth commissions are not
appropriate vehicles for transitional justice in many cases; only that
for at least the most culpable perpetrators, simply acknowledging the
crimes committed seems insufficient. One reason that the criminal
law has been invoked in such cases is because the behavior is seen as
pathological, 183 with all that implies, and the deaths and human rights
abuses carried out are seen not as incidental to a particular political
strategy, but as the intentional commission of terrible acts of cruelty.18 4 Blanket amnesties, particularly when issued by leaders who
have presided over the commission of atrocities to themselves and
their followers, are, for the most part, simply self-serving declarations
by government officials exempting themselves from the reach of the
law. They represent an attempt to trump the application of rules of
law, and as such constitute a threat to both the legitimacy and the
fairness of the rules. 18 5 In the poignant words of one Rwandan lawyer:
We are in the process of falling into the trap that these murderers have set for us.... This genocide is distinguished by the fact that
a maximum number of people have been implicated in the killings-there is talk of a million killers.... The Hutu extremists estimated that no court in the world could judge that many criminals,
and they bet that they were going to get off. Are we going to say
18 6
that they're right?
This leads us to the final normative challenge to international
criminal justice, the question of deterrence. Some authorities have
suggested that arguments supporting the establishment of a system of
180
181
182
183

Dugard, supra note 114, at 301.
Id.
Id.
For the view that human violence is "normal," not pathological, see PAUL SEARIGHT, THE COMPANY OF STRANGERS (2004).
184 Others label them morally unjust. Kent Greenawalt, Amnesty's Justice, in TRUTH
V. JUSTICE, supra note 120, at 189, 195-98.
185 See GOLDSTONE, supra note 122, at 122; cf. THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 16 (1995).
186 Laurent Bijard, Can Justice Be Done? Massacred: 1,000,000; Tried: 0, WORLD
PRESS REV., June 1996, at 6, 7 (quoting Rwandan lawyer Frd6ric Mutagwera).
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international criminal justice lack empirical foundation.18 7 Yet, there
is at least some anecdotal evidence that we are witnessing shifts in political and social behavior, suggesting social and possibly political
norm internalization, although a full exploration of this issue is beyond the ambit of the current project. Reports of discussions at international conferences, the agenda and discussions at the meetings of
grassroots NGOs, newspaper and other media reporting, popular television shows in the United States such as Law and Order and the West
Wing,18 8 continually emphasize the need for war crimes trials (such as
in the case of Saddam Hussein, for example) and the importance of
accountability. This shift in public perception appears to have penetrated, perhaps in a very limited manner, even internal government
decision making processes.
Take, for example, the following colloquy between Shimon Peres
and Avigdor Lieberman, which took place in 2002, between the members of the Israeli Cabinet discussing what policy would best address
the threat of Palestinian suicide bombers:
Mr. Lieberman: "'At 8 a.m. we'll bomb all the commercial centres ... at noon we'll bomb their gas stations ... at two we'll bomb
their banks .. . '"189

Mr. Peres (interrupting): "'And at 6 p.m. you'll receive an invitation
19 0
to the international tribunal in the Hague."

Although Mr. Peres was incorrect to suggest the existence of any
tribunal with jurisdiction over Israel or the Occupied Territories, 191
his response to Mr. Lieberman's proposal is intriguing, suggesting
that sporadic enforcement of international humanitarian law in some
situations may have some deterrent value on the conduct of hostilities
187 Because deterrence is also largely unproven in domestic legal orders, it is not
clear whether this line of argumentation suggests that national, as well as international, criminal justice systems should be abandoned. See Dan M. Kahan, The Secret
Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARv. L. REv. 414, 416 (1999) ("Empirically, deterrence
claims [in the United States] are speculative."). If they concede that empirical claims
for deterrence in national legal systems are also speculative, but do not think that
national criminal justice systems should be abandoned, the question is why they perceive the importance of deterrence in justifying the existence of an international
system of criminal justice to be different.
188 Another recent example is the Sydney Pollack movie, The Interpreter.
189 Paul Peachey, We Risk Charges of War Crimes, Peres Tells Cabinet, THE INDEPENDENT (London), Mar. 7, 2002, at 13.
190 Id.
191 Israel is not a party to the International Criminal Court Statute, the Occupied
Territories lack statehood and cannot ratify the International Criminal Court Treaty,
and neither the ICTY nor ICTR have any jurisdiction over actions occurring outside
the scope of their limited temporal and national jurisdictions.
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in other fora. 19 2 It is nonetheless probably fair to state that the international criminal justice system has not yet reached the stage at which
its deterrent value may be fairly assumed. Erratic enforcement of international criminal law remains, at this point, the exception, not the
rule. Yet, if it is unclear whether disclosing the truth about past
abuses or punishing those responsible will deter future abuses, there
is equally little proof that amnesties promote reconciliation whereas
criminal trials provoke relapses. 193 The most productive course is to
identify the difficulties involved in the prosecution of war crimes, 'and
adopt creative solutions to address them.1 94 Perhaps in cases of mass
atrocities, criminal trials, particularly international criminal trials,
should be required for those who bear the greatest responsibility,
while other mechanisms of accountability, including the use of conditional amnesties, truth commissions, lustration laws, reparations,
counseling, and other measures, may be appropriate for lower-level
perpetrators.
B.

Recent Developments in State and InternationalPractice

1. Universal Jurisdiction and Amnesties in National Courts:
Eichmann, Pinochet and Their Progeny
Although Israel's abduction, indictment, and conviction of Adolf
Eichmann in the 1960s seems now like ancient history, its drama and
legacy continue to have extraordinary contemporary relevance. Eichmann, of course, was one of the principal architects of the Nazis' "final solution," and was personally responsible for the ghettoization,
deportation, and extermination of Jews in Austria, Germany, Hungary
192

Reports of interviews with Sudanese rebel leaders suggest the same effect. See,

e.g., Samantha Power, Court of First Resort, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2005, at A23 (stating

that Musa Hilal, the coordinator of the Janjaweed militia in Darfur, told her that he
did "not belong at the Hague").
193

Aryeh Neier, What Should Be Done About the Guilty, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Feb. 1,

1990, at 32, 35.
194 A recent study examining the relationship between the Yugoslavia Tribunal
and the Bosnian legal community identified some problems in the relationship between the Tribunal and Bosnian legal professionals. Concerns were noted in the following areas: "location of the ICTY; judicial appointments; criticisms by international
organizations of the Bosnian legal system; a misunderstanding of the hybrid nature of
ICTY judicial procedures; the inherently political nature of a United Nations-sponsored ad hoc tribunal; and the lack of communication between Bosnian and Tribunal
legal professionals." The Human Rights Ctr. et al., Justice, Accountability and Social
Reconstruction:An Interview Study of BosnianJudges and Prosecutors, 18 BERKELEYJ. INT. L.
102, 144 (2000).
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and the Soviet Union. 195 He escaped to Argentina in 1950, where he
was later joined by his family, and lived a quiet life as an employee of
Mercedes-Benz in Buenos Aires.1 9 6 Eichmann had not made any particular effort to hide his identity, but Argentina had not attempted to
find, try or extradite many of the Germans that had fled there after
the war, offering them a sort of "transnational amnesty" expressed implicitly, rather than explicitly. Argentina objected to Israel's abduction of Eichmann from Buenos Aires on May 11, 1960,197 but
ultimately he stood trial in Israel, indicted on four groups of charges:
crimes against the Jewish people; crimes against humanity; war crimes;
and membership in hostile organizations.
Eichmann was convicted on all fifteen counts and sentenced to
death,1 98 and the Israeli Supreme Court affirmed the conviction on
May 29, 1962.199 One of the primary legal issues the court addressed
on appeal was whether Israel had the authority, under international
law, to try Eichmann for crimes he had committed in other states.
The court found that Eichmann's trial was permitted by international
law, relying upon the holding in the Lotus case to support its conclusion that "as yet no international accord exists on the question of the
jurisdiction of a State to punish persons who are not its nationals for
acts committed beyond its borders. ' 20 0 Thus, the Israeli Supreme
Court declined to find any prohibition in Israeli municipal law based
upon the extraterritorial nature of the crimes. Additionally, the court
found that the crimes created by the Israeli Nazi and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law were crimes condemned by the law of nations,
entailing individual criminal responsibility, and evincing a "peculiarly
universal character... vest[ing] in every State the authority to try and
punish anyone who participated in their commission." 20 Finally, the
court concluded that these crimes are recognized as universal international crimes by reason of three particular features (features that we
now recognize may have constitutionalsignificance in modern interna195 Matthew Lippman, The Trial of Adolf Eichmann and the Protection of Universal
Human Rights Under InternationalLaw, 5 Hous. J. INT'L L. 1, 2-5 (1982). For an account of the trial and surrounding issues, see HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM (1976).
196 Lippman, supra note 195, at 5.
197 Id. at 7-12.
198 Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 5 (Isr. DC,Jer 1961), affd, 36 I.L.R. 277 (Isr. S. Ct.
1962).
199 Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 277. He was acquitted of acts committed prior to 1941,
apparently based upon the Nuremberg precedent of limiting crimes against humanity
to acts committed in connection with the war. Id.
200 Id. at 285.
201 Id. at 287.
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tional law): "[They] constitute acts which damage vital international
interests; they impair the foundations and security of the international
community; they violate the universal moral values and humanitarian
principles that lie hidden in the criminal law systems adopted by civi20 2
lized nations."
There were many critics of Eichmann's trial, both as to its form
and substance. Yet the trial ultimately goaded the West Germans into
taking more seriously the prosecution of former Nazis 20 3 and clearly
influenced other national courts in asserting jurisdiction over crimes
20 4
against humanity they had suffered during the Second World War.
In the modern day assessment of one expert, Israel's "relatively responsible exercise of universal jurisdiction" must be favorably received
20 5
in a world where "impunity and crude vengeance are the rule."
It was not simply coincidence that induced Eichmann and many
other Nazis to seek refuge in Latin America, and indeed, during the
years following the Eichmann trial, Argentina and its TransAndino
neighbor, Chile, became the situs of a wave of terrible human rights
atrocities committed by government officials, military officers, and
paramilitary forces, including "death squads." It has been estimated
by human rights groups that from the period following the overthrow
of Salvador Allende, Chile's elected President, by General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte in 1973, until Pinochet's abdication and "self-amnesty"
in 1990, thousands of people were killed or disappeared at the hands
of Pinochet's police, tens of thousands of Chileans fled, and
thousands more were arrested. 20 6 Similarly, in Argentina, the military
junta that ruled the country from 1976 until 1983 caused the deaths
20 7
and disappearances of thousands of civilians.
The human rights abuses in Chile and Argentina, and the amnesties with which the putative perpetrators were provided have spawned
lawsuits all over the globe in recent years, as victims have sought to
202 Id. at 291.
203 This had been a spot of contention not only with Israel, but other European
nations as well, such as France.
204 See, e.g., Leila Sadat Wexler, From Touvier to Barbie and Back Again: The Application of the Nuremberg Principles by the French Court of Cassation, 32 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 289 (1994) (describing the trials of Klaus Barbie and Paul Touvier for crimes
against humanity committed in France during WWII).
205 GaryJ. Bass, The Adolf Eichmann Case: Universal and NationalJurisdiction,in UNIVERSAILJURISDICTION,

supra note 21, at 77, 90.

206 Clifford Kraus, Chilean Military Faces Reckoningfor Its Dark Past,N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
3, 1999, § 1, at 1.
207 Leopold Galtieri, 76, of Falkland Rout, Dies, N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 2003, at B6 ("The
junta was . . .found responsible for the death and disappearance of up to 30,000
people in Argentina's so-called Dirty War.").
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bring prosecutions-first in foreign fora-later, domestically, in Argentine and Chilean courts. The most significant foreign forum for
the Argentine and Chilean cases has been Spain, for a variety of substantive and procedural reasons. 20 8 Two investigating judges accepted
complaints against Argentine and Chilean suspects, and the Spanish
public prosecutor objected to jurisdiction. In 1998, the Spanish National Court, the Audiencia Nacional,20 9 held that the Spanish courts
could exercise jurisdiction over genocide, torture2 10 and terrorism alleged to have been committed in Chile under Spain's universal jurisdiction law, subject to a caveat (known as the "subsidiarity principle")
that if a court in the territorial state had exercised its jurisdiction,
then the Spanish courts would defer to that court, at least as to
charges of genocide. 2 11 The court stated:
That the Contracting Parties [to the genocide convention] have not
criminalized this offense universally in each of their domestic jurisdictions does not stand in the way of a State party establishing such
a category of jurisdiction for an offense that has a major impact
worldwide, and that affects the international community directly, all
of humanity....
2 12
Terrorism is also a crime to be prosecuted internationally ....
The court also rejected the defendants' amnesty arguments, stating that not only could an amnesty be contrary to the principle of jus
cogens, but that the amnesty in Chile or Argentina would have no relevance to a prosecution in Spain under a law granting universal juris208

See Naomi Roht-Arriaza, UniversalJurisdiction: Steps Forward, Steps Back, 17 LEiL. 375, 376-77 (2004). These include the fact that the Spanish laws on
extraterritoriality were well known, the fact that there were victims of Spanish nationality in both cases, and procedural advantages including the right of victims to file
cases, as well as the right of "popular accusers" (reputable nongovernment groups
concerned with the public interest) to file complaints, become parties and even intervene in cases at many stages of the proceedings. Id. at 377. This is consistent with the
practice in many European countries.
209 Order of the Criminal Chamber of the Spanish Audiencia Nacional Affirming
Spain's Jurisdiction To Try Crimes of Genocide and Terrorism Committed During
the Chilean Dictatorship, SAN, Nov. 5, 1998 (No. 173/98), translated in THE PINOCHET
PAPERS: THE CASE OF AUGUSTO PINOCHET IN SPAIN AND BRITAIN 95 (Reed Brody &
DENJ. INT'L

Michael Ratner eds., 2000) [hereinafter

PINOCHET PAPERS].

210 The court found it had no jurisdiction to hear the allegations of torture, but
suggested they were reachable as part of the genocide claim. See id. at 105.
211 Id. at 98. The court based this on Article 6 of the Genocide Convention, which
provides: "Persons charged with genocide.. . shall be tried by a competent tribunal of
the State in the territory of which the act was committed .... " Genocide Convention,
supra note 88, art. 6.
212
104.

Audiencia NacionalJurisdictionalOrder, SAN, Nov. 5, 1998 (No. 173/98), at 98,
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diction incorporated into Spanish municipal law. 2 13 Finally, the court

noted Spain's "legitimate interest in the exercise of its jurisdiction, as
more than fifty Spaniards were killed or disappeared in Chile, victims
2 14
of the repression denounced."
The Spanish decision opened the door to the prosecution of
General Pinochet in Spain, but received little international attention.
Instead, it was Pinochet's decision to travel to London to seek medical
treatment that caused the case to become an immediate international
cause cglbre. Unlike Eichmann, who could probably legitimately complain (to no avail, of course, mala captus bene detentus) about the legitimacy of his arrest, Pinochet was arrested in London (once he left the
"safety" of Chile) on a request for extradition from the Spanish investigating judge, Balthazar Garz6n, issued on October 16, 1998.215 Pinochet's lawyers protested, and his case was taken up by the British
courts in a series of decisions, culminating in an opinion by the House
of Lords rendered in the Spring of 1999 providing that Pinochet
could not benefit from his immunity as a former head of state and
2 16
could be extradited to Spain to stand charges.
Although the Lords' opinion is highly significant, had the Chilean courts not subsequently decided to pursue General Pinochet, the
opinion would have had little practical import. The Lords (six out of
seven) ultimately could only agree that Pinochet could stand trial for
acts charged that occurred after September 29, 1988, when the U.K_
courts would have had jurisdiction over the Spanish claims. This
meant that he was not extraditable on most of the charges, by one
estimate causing twenty-seven out of thirty charges to fail. 2 17 The
Lords' opinions are varied and interesting. Of particular note here is
Lord Browne-Wilkinson's opinion finding (drawing heavily from the
case law of the ICTY, as well as state practice) that the prohibition
against torture is a jus cogens, peremptory norm under international
law, 218 a crime that by its nature cannot be an act committed as a state

function. Lord Millett went even further, finding that
[c]rimes prohibited by international law attract universal jurisdiction under customary international law if two criteria are satisfied.
First, they must be contrary to a peremptory norm of international
213

Id. at 106.

214 Id. at 107.
215 R v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet (No. 3) (Pinochet
Il) [2000] 1 A.C. 147, 190 (H.L. 1999) (appeal taken from Q.B.) (separate opinion of
Lord Brown-Wilkinson).
216 Id. at 277.
217 PINOCHET PAPERS, supra note 209, at 37-38.
218 Pinochet III, [2000] 1 A.C. at 198 (separate opinion of Lord Brown-Wilkinson).
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law so as to infringe a jus cogens [sic]. Secondly, they must be so
serious and on such a scale that they can justly be regarded as an
21 9
attack on the international legal order.
Lord Goff of Chieveley disagreed, disputing both the existence of universal jurisdiction and the nonapplicability of head of state immunity.220 Finally, although Lord Phillips suggested that it was "an open
question whether international law recognizes universal jurisdiction in
respect of international crimes," 22 1 citing a lack of state practice on
the subject and the creation of international tribunals, he agreed with
Lord Browne-Wilkinson that a torturer could not benefit from immu22 2
nity that he himself granted as head of state.
Perhaps the most extraordinary legacy of the British Pinochetcase,
however, was less the jurisprudence it left and the specific result, than
the catalytic effect it appears to have had in Chile, Argentina, and
other countries looking to prosecute former dictators. 223 After the
House of Lords issued its opinion, although extradition proceedings
in the United Kingdom continued to proceed, the government of
Chile renewed its request to have Pinochet sent to Chile for prosecution.2 24 Ultimately, the British Foreign Minister released Pinochet (after 503 days in detention in the United Kingdom), 2 25 and he was sent
back to Chile, where he was apparently welcomed at Santiago airport
by top military officials. Pinochet's triumph, however, was short-lived,
for he was subsequently stripped of his immunity, and more than 170
complaints are now pending against him in Chilean courts. Moreover, in November of 2004, the Supreme Court of Chile held that the
amnesty law upon which he was relying could not apply to disappearances as they were ongoing (continuous) crimes. 226 Finally, although
until recently his attorneys had prevailed in blocking prosecutions
based on the argument that Pinochet was too ill to stand trial, in December 2004, Judge Juan Guzmdn declared him medically fit based
219
220
221
222
223

Id. at 275 (separate opinion of Lord Millett).
Id. at 206-24 (separate opinon of Lord Goff of Chieveley).
Id. at 288 (separate opinion of Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers).
Id. at 290.
Naomi Roht-Arriaza, The Pinochet Precedent and UniversalJurisdiction, 35 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 311, 315 (2001).
224 For a penetrating discussion of Chile's voyage towards democracy and human
rights, see ROHT-ARRiAzA, supra note 18, at 67-96.
225

A Chronology of the PinochetAffair, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, July 9, 2001, available

in LEXIS, Agence France Presse-English File.
226 Barcroft, supra note 18 (discussing Corte Suprema, Nov. 17, 2004 (Chile),
available at http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/chile/doc/krassnoff.html).
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apparently upon a lucid interview he had given to a media outlet in
2 27
the United States.
Like Chile, Argentina suffered in the 1970s and 80s from a repressive military rule that resulted in thousands disappeared and
dead. 228 Argentina's generals were able to act with impunity, not only

during their years in power but subsequently, due to a 1983 amnesty
law that was followed by two other amnesty enactments known as "Full
Stop" and "Due Obedience" laws. 2 29 Although space does not permit
a full treatment of the important developments in Argentina, several
courts have recently declared these laws unconstitutional, 230 as well as
inconsistent with international law. In the most recent of these decisions, the Argentine Supreme Court held that a life sentence given to
the murderers of General Carlos Prats, a Chilean who had been killed
in Buenos Aires in 1974 as part of Operation Condor, could be up-

227 Rohter, supra note 18.
228 Amnesty Int'l, supra note 18, at 2-3.
229 The Full Stop law adopted in 1986 prevented the hearing of cases filed with
the courts concerning abuses of human rights that may have occurred during the
military regime, by providing that the time period for bringing the action expired
sixty days following the enactment of the law. Ley de Punto Final [Full Stop Law],
Law No. 23492, Dec. 29, 1986, B.O. (Arg.), translated in Amnesty Int'l, supra note 18,
at 6 n.6. The Due Obedience law provided "commanding officers, subordinate officers, non-commissioned officers and members of the rank and file of the Armed
Forces, security forces, police force and prison force" with a presumption that they
had acted under the coercion of orders, and were therefore not punishable for abuses
committed during the same period. Ley de Obediencia Debiba [Due Obedience
Law], Law No. 23521,June 8,1987, B.O. (Arg.), translatedin Amnesty Int'l, supra note
18, at 6 n.6.
230 The first case finding the laws null and void was issued by Judge Gabriel
Cavallo on March 6, 2001. See Amnesty, Int'l, Argentina: Amicus Curiae Brief on the
Incompatibility with InternationalLaw of the Full Stop and Due Obedience Laws para. 3, Al

Index 13/012/2001, June 2001, available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/pdf/
AMR130122001ENGLISH/$File/AMR1301201.pdf (discussing Juzgado Nacional en
lo Criminal y Correctional Federal No. 4 [Fourth National Court for Criminal and
Correctional Matters], 6/3/2001, "Julio Sim6n, Juan Del Cerro"). His ruling was important because although the laws had been repealed in 1998, the repeal was interpreted as being nonretroactive, meaning that the cases of human fights violations
committed during the years of military rule could not be pursued. Id. para. 4. This
case was preceded, however, by an important ruling in 1999 which determined that
the statute of limitations could not be applied in a forced disappearance case, given
that the fate of the victim remained unknown. Additionally, the court held that international law applied to the case, given that enforced disappearance is a crime against
humanity. Id. para. 20 (discussing Cdmara Federal [Federal Chamber], 9/1999, "Rafael Videla, Emilio Massera").
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held. 23 1 The court found that the U.N. Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutes of Limitations could apply to the killing, even
though it had only recently been formally incorporated into the Argentine Constitution. 23 2 The court reasoned that the Convention simply expressed a principle already in existence as a matter of customary
international law at the time that the actions were committed. 23 3
In a similar case, Mexico's Supreme Court recently held that Ricardo Miguel Cavollo, an Argentinean former Navy Lieutenant, could
be extradited to Spain to face charges of genocide and terrorism for
crimes he committed during the "dirty war" period. 23 4 While some
commentators have suggested that the decision of the Supreme Court
does not appear to have been based upon the doctrine of universal
jurisdiction per se, 2 35 and indeed the court refused extradition on
counts of torture based upon the application of Mexico's statute of
limitations for those crimes, the decision is nonetheless important. In
particular, with regard to the amnesty relied upon by the accused in
Mexico, the Supreme Court approved the lower court's ruling that the
amnesty provided by Argentina's Full Stop and Due Obedience laws
amnesty had no application before a Mexican Court. The court held:
The fact that a State decided not to exercise jurisdiction in order to
prosecute crimes subject to international jurisdiction did not prevent any other State of an international agreement to exercise its
own jurisdiction. This is so because international treaties that are
applicable to the present case recognized the jurisdiction of any
State party to those treaties, namely, jurisdiction to prosecute them,
judge them and punish them in conformity with their domestic law
and the treaties themselves, with the purpose of preventing impunity.... Argentinean laws could not be binding on another State
nor would they have the legal effect of depriving it from exercising
jurisdiction, not only by virtue of its internal legislation, but also on
the basis of international treaties to which it is a party. 2 3 6
231 Barcroft, supra note 18 (discussing Corte Suprema deJusticia [CSJN], 24/9/
2004, "Arancibia Clavel, Enrique Lautaro s / recurso de hecho," (No. 259) (Arg.),
available at http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/arg/doc/arancibial.html).
232 Id. The Convention had been incorporated into the Argentine Constitution in
2003 by Argentine Law No. 25-778. See id.
233 Id.
234 Ricardo Miguel Cavallo, Procede el Amparo en Revision [Decision on the Extradition of Ricardo Miguel Cavallo], Pleno de la Suprema Corte dejusticia [S.C.J.N.]
[Supreme Court],Junio de 2003, Tesis P./J. 140/2002 (Mex.), excerpts translated in 42
I.L.M. 888 (2003).
235 Luis Benavides, Introductory Note to Supreme Court of Mexico: Decision on the Extradition of Ricardo Miguel Cavallo, 42 I.L.M. 884, 886 (2003).
236 Decision on the Extradition of Ricardo Miguel Cavallo, 42 I.L.M at 908-09.
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In its reasoning, the court relied upon the decision of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the case of BarriosAltos23 7 of March 14,
23 8
2001, as well as the 1997 Impunity Guidelines referred to earlier.
Unquestionably, the case law of the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights had its own catalytic effect upon courts in Latin America. For
example, in the Barrios Altos case, the government of Peru was
brought before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights regarding
a massacre of fifteen people (another four were seriously injured) that
occurred in Lima, Peru, on November 3, 1991.2 39 The attack was perpetrated by a government "death squadron," and before the courts
could properly investigate, the Congress of Peru adopted Amnesty
Law No. 26479 which exonerated members of the army, police force
and also civilians who had violated human rights from 1980 to
1995.240 The law was promulgated by Peru's President on June 15,
1995, and the investigation regarding the Barrios Altos case was
241
quashed.
In a landmark opinion, the Inter-American Court held:
[A]ll amnesty provisions, provisions on prescription and the establishment of measures designed to eliminate responsibility are inadmissible, because they are intended to prevent the investigation and
punishment of those responsible for serious human rights violations
such as torture, extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary execution and
forced disappearance, all of them prohibited because they violate
non-derogable rights recognized by international human rights
law.

2 42

Although the court's opinion does not address the question of amnesties for international crimes, per se, cases like Barrios Altos have certainly influenced domestic courts faced with amnesties in cases like

Cavallo.
The state practice emerging from the Latin American experience, as considered by Chile, Argentina, Spain, Mexico and the
United Kingdom, 243 suggests not only that domestic self-amnesties
237 Barrios Altos Case, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 75 (Mar. 14).
238 See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
239 BarriosAltos Case, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 75, at 2.
240 Id. at 3-4.
241
Id. at 4.
242 Id. at 14.
243 Proceedings were also brought against Pinochet in France, Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, Ecuador, and the Netherlands. Some of them were mooted by Pinochet's return to Chile (the Swiss case), and others were dismissed based upon
practical considerations (the Netherlands). In the German and Ecuadoran cases, the
jurisdictional link was based on the nationality of the victim. Only the Belgian case
appears to have proceeded as a true case of universal jurisdiction, the investigating
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may have a limited shelf-life in the country of origin, but, also appear
to have no staying power when considered outside the country where
granted.2 44 That principle seems to be accepted by international
human rights bodies and international courts, as we shall see in a moment, and indeed the jurisprudence of international courts has influenced national courts in an extraordinary example of transnational
judicial dialogue in which courts in the international and domestic
legal orders have looked to each other for guidance in a rich and
mutually reinforcing relationship. Indeed, courts have together been
able to strengthen the fight against impunity more than any one court
alone probably could. 245 Interestingly, however, although the principle that domestic amnesties for international crimes have no extraterritorial effect appears clearly to have been strengthened in recent
decisions, the same cannot be said of the reach of universal jurisdiction itself, as the following sections make clear.

magistrate finding that the "prohibition of crimes against humanity [of which Pinochet was accused] [being] part of customary international law and jus cogens."
Sriram, supra note 116, at 55-57.
244 Another interesting example is provided by the constitutional debate that occurred in France as a result of France's decision to ratify the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court. The Treaty was submitted to France's constitutional
court for an opinion as to the compatibility of the International Criminal Court Statute with France's Constitution. While several issues arose from the reference and the
Conseil Constitutionnets reply, of interest in this case is that the Conseil found that
ratification of the Rome Statute would necessarily require constitutional revision, because, although the Treaty respected French national sovereignty in general, certain
specific provisions, such as presidential immunity granted by the Constitution and the
application of amnesty laws as a function of French national sovereignty, were not
compatible with obligations France would be assuming by ratifying the Rome Statute.
See Beale Rudolf, Statute of the InternationalCriminal Court, Decision No. 98-408DC, 1999
JO. 1317, 94 AM. J. INr'L L. 391, 391-94 (2000) (discussing CC decision no. 98-408
DC, Jan. 22, 1999, J.O. 1317, available at http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/decision/1998/98408/98408dc.htm).
The solution adopted was the amendment of France's Constitution, which was
effectuated by the French Parliament by an overwhelming majority in July, 1999. Id.
at 394. During the debates in the National Assembly, the Senate, and before both
bodies sitting as a Congress, most speakers suggested that although ratification of the
Statute would impinge, at least modestly on French sovereignty, in the case of serious
crimes under international law, this was a small price to pay, and that, in any event,
amnesties for crimes against humanity, genocide or war crimes were incompatible
with the rule of law.
245 See, e.g., Laurence R. Heifer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective SupranationalAdjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 370-72 (1997); Koh, supra note 22,
at 2656-58; Waters, supra note 21, at 506-08.
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The Relationship Between Amnesty and Universal Jurisdiction:
The Spanish and Belgian (Temporary?) Retreats

Following the adoption of the Rome Statute for the International
Criminal Court in July of 1998 and the House of Lords opinion in the
Pinochet case in March 1999, there was optimism from human rights
activists that the principle of universal jurisdiction-whether universal
inter-statejurisdiction, or universal internationaljurisdiction exercised
by the International Criminal Court or other international tribunalswould be used to rein in so-called "traveling tyrants." Yet recent developments at both the international and domestic level suggest than any
optimism should probably be tempered, at least as regards jurisdiction
over jus cogens crimes exercised by states, and perhaps even as regards
the exercise ofjurisdiction by the international community as a whole.
This section discusses some of the doctrinal evolution that has occurred at the national level; the international case law is discussed in
Part II.B.3, below.
The country perhaps most admired (or reviled) in regard to its
laws on universal jurisdiction is Belgium. In 1993, Belgium adopted a
law providing its courts with universal jurisdiction over war crimes. 246
The law was amended in 1999 to extend Belgium's jurisdiction over
crimes against humanity. 247 Although many, particularly European,
states were asserting jurisdiction over foreigners accused of committing human rights abuses abroad at the time, 248 Belgium was nearly
alone in basing the assertion of jurisdiction solely on the concept of
universal jurisdiction, 249 although even many of the cases filed in the
Belgian courts were filed by foreigners residing there. Nonetheless,
Belgium became a magnet for cases concerning grievances around
the world: Rwandese citizens alleging themselves to be victims of
Rwanda's 1994 genocide; a group of Chadian former detainees alleging their abuse at the hands of Chad's former President, Hisslne
Habr6; a group of Congolese citizens resident in Belgium accusing
Abdulaye Yerodia Ndombasi of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity; a complaint against Israel's Prime
Minister, Ariel Sharon, alleging his responsibility for the massacre at
Sabra and Shatila in 1982; and a group of Iraqis filed two separate
complaints against U.S. President George H.W. Bush, Vice President
Dick Cheney, then Secretary of State Colin Powell, General Norman
Schwarzkopf, and General Tommy Franks arising out of both the 1991
246
247
248
249

Amended 1993 Belgium Law, supra note 26, arts. 1, 7.
Id.
Sriram, supra note 116, at 66-67.
Id.
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and 2003 U.S. invasions of Iraq. 250 Although only one judgment was

actually rendered on the basis of the 1993 law, as amended, more than
251
forty claims were brought thereunder.
Belgium succumbed to the tremendous international pressure to
revisit its exercise of "pure" universal jurisdiction, which it did, amending its 1993 law in 2003 in two important respects. First, it included a
provision essentially responding to the ICJ's opinion in the Yerodia
case, discussed below, to the effect that Belgium had violated the international immunity of Yerodia by issuing an international arrest warrant against him while he was a sitting foreign minister for the
Democratic Republic of the Congo. 252 Under the new amendments,
Belgium will respect the "limits established under international law"
when evaluating the immunity of an accused otherwise liable to prosecution. 253 Second, Belgium has limited the application of "pure"
cases of universal jurisdiction, by providing that only a federal prosecutor may determine whether to bring a case under the Belgian law,
and only if one of four situations exists: the violation was not committed on Belgian territory; the alleged offender is not in Belgium; the
alleged offender is not located within Belgian territory; and the victim
254
is not Belgium or has not resided in Belgium for at least three years.
Even in such cases, the Federal Prosecutor must bring the case (not
victims groups, as was possible under the 1993 law, as amended), unless an additional "filtering" provision requires or suggests he should
desist. Universal jurisdiction remains an option, even if the accused is
250 Stefaan Smis & Kim Van der Borght, IntroductoryNote to Belgium's Amendment to
the Law ofJune 16, 1993 (As Amended by the Law of February 10, 1999), Concerning the
Punishment of Grave Breaches of HumanitarianLaw, 42 I.L.M. 740, 743 (2003); Glenn
Frankel, Belgian War Crimes Law Undone by Its Global Reach, WASH. POST, Sept. 30, 2003,
at Al; Human Rights Watch, Belgium: Anti-Atrocity Law Limited, Apr. 5, 2003, http:/
/hrw.org/english/docs/2003/04/05/begiu5488.htm.
251 Smis & Van der Borght, supra note 250, at 742.
252 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 1, 70
(Feb. 14), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iCOBE/icobejudgment/icobe-ijudgment 20020214.PDF.
253 Loi du 23 avril 2003 modifiant la loi du 16juin 1993 relative Ala repression des
violations graves du droit international humanitaire et l'article 144ter du Code
judiciaire [Belgium's Amendment to the Law of June 15, 1993 (As Amended by the
Law of February 10, 1999) Concerning the Punishment of Grave Breaches of Humanitarian Law, Law of April 23, 2003] art. 4, Moniteur Beige, May 7, 2003, at 24,846
(Belg.), translated in 42 I.L.M. 749 (2003).
254 Id. art. 7, § 1, 42 I.L.M. at 755. The English translation in I.L.M. has two important errors that I have corrected. First, the four conditions are conjunctive, not
disjunctive; the English translation omits an "and" that is found in the French. Second, the French is clear that only the Federal Prosecutor may bring the case in the
situation envisaged in Article 7, section 1.
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not found in and has no connection to Belgium directly, but the Belgian courts are instructed to refrain from exercising universal jurisdiction in absentiaif "more appropriate mechanisms to obtain justice for
the victims exist.."2 55 Although some commentators have expressed
disappointment in the Belgian amendments, suggesting that they will
result in a "high degree of ill-defined discretion left to officials susceptible to political pressures" (rather than judges) ,256 others have suggested that the amendments properly incorporate Belgium into a
"comprehensive international system" for the prosecution of interna257
tional crimes.
We now return to the Spanish courts, which, particularly following the Pinochet affair, became a magnet for the filing of cases based
upon universal jurisdiction. One such case was filed on December 2,
1999, by Nobel Laureate Rigoberta Menchdi Tum against several Guatemalan heads of state, accusing them of terrorism, genocide, torture
and other crimes against Spanish citizens, Guatemalans, and citizens
from third states. 258 An investigating judge initiated an investigation,
and the Prosecutor appealed. The appeals court dismissed the complaints, relying upon the earlier decision in the Pinochet case to the
effect that, under the theory of "subsidiarity," the Spanish courts
would not exercise their jurisdiction unless the territorial state courts
were "inactive." 25 9 The case was appealed to the Spanish Tribunal
Supremo (Spain's Supreme Court), which limited, in an 8-7 decision,
the jurisdiction of the Spanish courts to the crimes of torture committed against Spanish citizens.2 60 As to the allegations of genocide, torture and terrorism concerning the Guatemalan population at large,
the case was dismissed.
255 Smis & Van der Borght, supra note 250, at 744.
256

E.g., Roht-Arriaza, supra note 208, at 387-88.

257

E.g., Smis & Van der Borght, supra note 250, at 744.

258 Guatemala Genocide Case, STS, Feb. 25, 2003 (No. 327/2003) (Spain), translated in 42 I.L.M. 686 (2003). According to the Supreme Court, the complaint covered the period 1978-1990, during Guatemala's civil war, and included references to
the killing of Spanish citizens during an attack on the Spanish Embassy in 1980, as
well as the assassinations of Spanish Catholic priests. Id. at 689. For an excellent
description of accountability efforts in Guatemala, see generally Susan Kemp, The Inter-Relationship Between the Guatemalan Commission for Historical Clarification and the
Search forJustice in National Courts, 15 CRIM. L.F. 67 (2004).
259 Order of the Criminal Chamber of the Spanish Audiencia Nacional Affirming
Spain's Jurisdiction To Try Crimes of Genocide and Terrorism Committed During
the Chilean Dictatorship, SAN, Nov. 5, 1998 (No. 173/98), translated inTHE PINOCHET
PAPERS, supra note 209, at 98; see also supra notes 211-12 and accompanying text.
260 Guatemala Genocide Case, 42 I.L.M. at 702.
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The court's ruling is interesting both on the question of jurisdiction and the "subsidiarity principle" evoked by the state. 26 1 As to the
latter, the difficulty of the complainants, according to the court, was
that the claims presented to the Spanish courts had not actually been
presented to the courts of Guatemala and dismissed. The complainants attempted to show that Guatemala's judicial system did not guarantee compliance with the law, and even assisted in carrying out
violence towards Guatemalans, generally contributing to a situation of
utter impunity within the country. 26 2 They cited documents showing
a lack of activity on the part of Guatemala's authorities on the question of specific instances of disappearances; the reports of human
rights groups and the Inter-American Human Rights Commission; the
report of Guatemala's "Historical Clarification Commission" and the
"Recovery of Historical Memory"-all in vain. 263 The Supreme Court
found that none of these documents established the "evidentiary
facts" as to the lack of activity on the part of Guatemala's judicial sys2 64
tem required to make the case admissible in Spain.
The court agreed that genocide was a crime over which universal
jurisdiction could properly be exercised, in principle. 26 5 The court
did not appear to find, however, that acts of terrorism and torture had
the same status. Arguably departing from the broad holding of the
Spanish Audencia Nacional in the Pinochet case, the majority opined
"there is significant support in doctrine for the idea that no state may
unilaterally establish order through criminal law, against everyone
and the entire world, without there being some point of connection
2 66
which legitimizes the extraterritorial extension of its jurisdiction."
The dissent disagreed profoundly with the court's opinion as to
the universality of the crimes charged. Finding that neither the Spanish legislature nor the Genocide Convention itself required the application of the principle of subsidiarity, the dissent found that
"universal jurisdiction over crimes of genocide as crimes of international law is not governed by a principle of subsidiarity, but rather by a

261 See supra notes 209-12 and accompanying text.
262 See Guatemala Genocide Case, 42 I.L.M. at 694.
263 See id.
264 Id. This finding was roundly criticized by the dissent as unnecessarily restrictive and contrary to law. Id. at 706-07 (dissenting opinion).
265 Id. at 695 (majority opinion).
266 Id. at 698. The court then surveyed the other crimes alleged, examining the
Torture Convention and several antiterrorism treaties. It found that "universal junsdiction is not expressly provided for in any of these treaties." Id. at 700-01.
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principle of concurrent jurisdiction, given that its precise purpose is
to prevent impunity."26 7 The dissenting opinion concludes:
The exercise of universal jurisdiction, by eradicating impunity
for the most grave crimes against humanity, contributes to peace
and to the humanization of our civilization. It is true that it does
not bring life back to the victims, nor can it achieve the goal of
prosecuting all of those who are responsible. It helps to secure a
more safe and just world, and helps strengthen international law, in
26 8
place of violence, as [] the usual means of resolving conflicts.

In another example of "transjudicial dialogue," the dissent refers

not only to Spanish cases, but to the decisions of the ICJ, 269 the German Constitutional Court,2 70 the Supreme Court of Belgium, 27 1 the
Supreme Court of France, 27 2 and the U.K House of Lords. 273 The
dissent also found that the majority had erred in interpreting the legislature's grant of jurisdiction to the courts, arguing that the legislature had incorporated into Spanish law "the principle of universal
jurisdiction, in function of the grave nature of these violations against
the essential interests of the international community, accepting the
principle if ius cogens."2 74 Finally, although critiquing the nexus requirement between the acts charged and Spanish sovereignty, the dissent argued that even if a nexus were required, it was present. 2 75 The
opinion emphasized that the Spanish government and Spanish citizens in Guatemala had suffered attacks as a result of their efforts to
protect Guatemala's Mayan population. Finally, it underscored the
267 Id. at 705 (dissenting opinion).
268 Id. at 712.
269 Id. at 709 (citing Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugo.), 1996 I.C.J. 91 (July 11)).
270 Id. (citing Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court]
Dec. 12, 2000, 2 BVR 1290/99 (F.R.G.), available at http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/text/rk20001 21 2_2bvrl 29099 (confirming the constitutionality of the sentencing by German courts for acts of genocide committed by Serbs
in Bosnia against Bosnian victims, in circumstances not directly affecting German
interests) ).
271 Id. (citing Cour de Cassation [Supreme Court], Feb. 12, 2003 (No.
P.02.1139.F/1) (Belg.), translated in 42 I.L.M. 596 (2003)).
272 Id. (citing Cour de Cassation, Chambre Criminelle [Cass. crim.] [highest court
of ordinary criminal jurisdiction], Dec. 20, 1985 (Fr.), translated in 78 I.L.R. 125
(1988)).
273 Id. (citing v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet (No. 3)
(Pinochet II1) [2000] 1 A.C. 147 (H.L. 1999) (appeal taken from Q.B.)). The dissent,
like the majority, is somewhat selective in its choice of authority, citing only the opinions in the Pinochet case, for example, that supported its conclusion!
274 Id.
275 Id. at 711.
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"cultural, historical, social, linguistic, legal" and other links uniting
Guatemala and its indigenous population to Spain, noting that Spain
shared the same cultural community as Guatemala, and could not be
considered as "foreign" to the fate of the Mayan people. 27 6 One point
not taken up with particularity in the dissent, but worth noting, is that
the complainants were probably entirely correct in their assessment of
Guatemala's legal system. In a recent decision by the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights, the court cited with approval expert testimony to the effect that in Guatemala "'justice is slow, inefficient, it is
corrupt, fearful,' and partial, particularly when those with any political
power are prosecuted."' 27 7 Moreover, the court found that as a result
of corruption and fear, "99.9% of cases of human rights violations go
27 8
unpunished"-impunity appears to be the rule, not the exception.
More recently, The New York Times reported that Guatemala's highest
court dismissed a "landmark war-crimes trial against [16] soldiers accused of the mass killing of hundreds of .... unarmed civilians in the
village of Dos Erres in 1982," ruling that the soldiers were exempt
from prosecution.2 79 Perhaps because of this, just as this Article was
going to press, the Spanish Constitutional Court quashed the opinion
of the Spanish Supreme Court, holding that "the principle of universal jurisdiction takes precedence over the existence or not of national
280
interests."
3.

Recent International Decisions and Practice

In addition to the practice of the U.N. Human Rights Committee,
as well as regional human rights courts, particularly in the Americas,
four international legal decisions were recently handed down on the
question of amnesties and the related problem of immunities for jus
cogens crimes. In the first, Prosecutorv. Furundzija,281 the ICTY held
that not only was the prohibition on torture jus cogens, but that any
28 2
amnesty therefore would be inconsistent with international law.

The discussion of amnesties was not necessary to the resolution of the
case, as the problem of amnesties was not raised during the proceedings; however, the Trial Chamber cited with approval a Comment
from the Human Rights Committee that "[a]mnesties are generally
276 Id.
277 Bamaca Velasquez Case, 2000 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 70, at 229 (Nov.
25) (quoting expert testimony of Helen Mack).
278 Id.
279 Guatemala: Court Voids War Crimes Trial N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2005, at A8.
280 See Right To Try Genocide Crimes Committed Abroad, supra note 27.
281 Case No. IT-95-17/I-T, Judgment (Dec. 10, 1998).
282 Id.
153, 156.
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incompatible with the duty of States to investigate [torture] .283
Moreover, the Trial Chamber noted that even in the light of an amnesty, a prosecution could be instituted either before a foreign court,
an international tribunal, or in their own country under a subsequent
regime.

28 4

Although Furundzija only addressed the issue of amnesty in passing, the question was squarely presented last year to the Special Court
for Sierra Leone. The SCSL was established on January 16, 2002, by
agreement entered into between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone.2 85 The jurisdiction ratione materie of the SCSL
included, inter alia, crimes against humanity and war crimes. In an
opinion on the question of amnesties for international crimes, dated
March 14, 2004, the Special Court considered the appeals of two defendants who argued the amnesty granted under the Lom6 Peace
2 6
Agreement precluded their trial before the SCSL.
The defendants argued that, notwithstanding the international
nature of the crimes, the SCSL was bound to respect the amnesty
granted by the Lom6 Agreement because the Agreement was an international treaty, having been signed by six states and a number of international organizations, including the RUF. 287 The SCSL disagreed,
holding that
[t]he role of the UN as a mediator of peace, the presence of a
peace-keeping force which generally is by consent of the State and
283 Id. 91 155 n.172 (citing Compilation of General Recommendations Adopted by
Human Rights Treaty Bodies, at 30, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 (July 29, 1994)).
284 Id. 91155.
285 Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone
on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone,Jan. 16, 2002, U.N. Doc. S/
2002/246/Annex (Mar. 8, 2002). The negotiations were undertaken pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1315, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1315 (Aug. 14, 2000).
286 Prosecutor v. Kallon & Kamara, Case Nos. SCSL-2004-15-AR72(E), SCSL-200416-AR72(E), Decision on Challenge toJurisdiction: Lom6 Accord Amnesty, 9 1 (Mar.
13, 2004). This provision was negotiated between the Government of Sierra Leone
and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) on July 7, 1999. Although a representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations and outside governments signed
as "Moral Guarantors" of the agreement, only two factions of Sierra Leonians were
parties thereto: President Kabbah, who signed on behalf of the Sierra Leone government, and Corporal Sankoh on behalf of the RUF. It was ratified by the Parliament of
Sierra Leone on July 15, 1999. After the RUF reneged on the agreement, the President of Sierra Leone wrote to the Security Council requesting the establishment of a
"court.. . to administer international justice and humanitarian law." Letter from the
Permanent Representative, Sierra Leone, to the President of the Security Council,
United Nations (Aug. 9, 2000), at 3, U.N. Doc. S/2000/786/Annex (Aug. 10, 2000).
287 Kallon & Kamara, Case Nos. SCSL-2004-15-AR72(E), SCSL-2004-16-AR72(E),

91 22, 30.
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the mediation efforts of the Secretary-General cannot add up to a
source of obligation to the international community to perform an
288
agreement to which the UN is not a party.
Instead, the court found that the agreement could not be characterized as an international instrument.2 8 9 Conversely, it held that Article
10 of the Special Court's Statute, forbidding the Special Court from
taking into consideration "an amnesty granted to any person falling
within the jurisdiction of the Special Court in respect of [international] crimes [within the Special Court's jurisdiction] shall not be a
bar to prosecution," did apply.290 Therefore, any amnesty granted to
the accused had no effect. In the words of the Special Court:
Where jurisdiction is universal, a State cannot deprive another State
of its jurisdiction to prosecute the offender by the grant of amnesty.
It is for this reason unrealistic to regard as universally effective the
grant of amnesty by a State in regard to grave international crimes
in which there exists universal jurisdiction. A State cannot bring
into oblivion and forgetfulness a crime, such as a crime against international law, which other States are entitled to keep alive and
29 1
remember.
The Special Court concluded that the crimes within its jurisdictioncrimes against humanity and war crimes committed in internal armed
conflict-are the subject of universal jurisdiction under international
law.292 Going beyond many of the national court decisions referred to
above, which found that states were entitled to exercise jurisdiction
over such crimes, the Special Court suggested that the prosecution of
such crimes was perhaps required, given that "the obligation to protect human dignity is a peremptory norm and has assumed the nature
29 3
of obligation erga omnes."
The third decision is the ICJ's opinion in the Yerodia case. 294 The
separate and dissenting opinions filed in that case offer an interesting
perspective on the question of universal jurisdiction and universal jurisdiction crimes under international law. The court held that Yer288

Id. 1 39.

289
290

Id. 1 49.
Id. 11 53, 64 (quoting Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone art. 10

(2000)).
291 Id. 1 67.
292 Id. 1 69.
293 Id. 1 71. Somewhat inconsistently, the court suggested that domestic amnesties for such crimes were lawful. Id.
294 Arrest Warrant of I April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.CJ. 1 (Feb.
14), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iCOBE/icobejudgment/icobe
_ijudgment_20020214.PDF.
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odia was immune from Belgium's criminal jurisdiction by virtue of his
status as a sitting foreign minister of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo. 29 5 However, perhaps to meet the critique that its decision
could promote impunity for international crimes, the court stated that
several fora would nonetheless be available for his prosecution-that
is, his immunity before the courts of Belgium was not tantamount to
impunity for the commission of crimes under international law. 2 96 In

particular, an accused could be tried before the courts of his own
state, in a foreign state if either his state waived its immunity or after
his tenure in office ceased, 29 7 and finally, "an incumbent or former
foreign minister for Foreign Affairs may be subject to criminal proceedings before certain international criminal courts, where they have
jurisdiction. ' 298 The ICJ referred specifically in this paragraph to the

International Criminal Court, and the ad hoc Tribunals for Rwanda
and the Former Yugoslavia, but did not foreclose other international
courts from relying upon this holding in support of their own jurisdiction. 299 This holding has proven to be more than theoretical, for on
May 31, 2004, the Special Court faced the question of immunity for a
sitting head of state, namely Charles Taylor.30 0 In a fascinating opinion, the Special Court opined that because it was an international, not
301
a domestic court, the immunity invoked by Taylor could not apply.
The Special Court, while admitting that it was not "immediately evident" why national and international courts could differ as to their
treatment of immunities under international law, 302 suggested that:
first, the principle of the sovereignty of states was inapplicable, given
the court's status as an international organ; and second, as a matter of
policy, "'states have considered the collective judgment of the international community to provide a vital safeguard against the potential
destabilizing effect of unilateral judgment in this area.' ',303 Of course,
295 Id. 58.
296 Id. 60.
297 Here, however, the court has created significant confusion as to what acts may
be chargeable, stating that he may be charged with acts subsequent to his period of
office "as well as in respect of acts committed during that period of office in a private
capacity." Id. 1 61.
298 Id.
299 Id.
300 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
301 Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-1, Decision on Immunity from
Jurisdiction, 51 (May 31, 2004), available at http://www.sc-sl.org/Documents/SCSL03-01-I-059.pdf.
302 Id.
303 Id. (quoting Amicus Brief of Professor Diane Orentlicher at 15, Taylor, Case
No. SCSL-2003-01-1).
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as alluded to above, there is another explanation of the difference
between the jurisdiction of national and international courts in this
area, which is that they are not exercising the same form of universaljurisdic30
tion at all.

C.

4

The Legality of Amnesties Under InternationalLaw

Principle 7(1) of the Princeton Principles on UniversalJurisdiction
provides that "[a] mnesties are generally inconsistent with the obligation of states to provide accountability for serious crimes under international law,"'3 0 5 suggesting the undesirability, but perhaps not a per

se prohibition, on all domestic amnesties for jus cogens crimes under
international law. The view taken by the drafters of the Principlesin
2001 has been strengthened by recent state and international practice, and indeed, research to date has not uncovered any recent case
in which a foreign or international court has respected a state amnesty
with respect to a jus cogens crime. Nonetheless, even if courts are unwilling to consider amnesties for jus cogens crimes as having any extraterritorial effect (or any effect before international courts), they are
still hesitant to declare them unlawful per se. For example, the amnesty opinion of the SCSL held (perhaps as dictum), that although
the Lom, amnesty was inapplicable before it, there was "not yet any
general obligation for States to refrain from amnesty laws on these
[jus cogens] crimes. Consequently, if a State passes any such law, it
306
does not breach a customary rule."
This hesitancy is perhaps because the law in this area has been
slow to evolve and is in disarray. As to war crimes, most authorities
distinguish between amnesties that might be given for crimes committed in international and noninternational armed conflict. 30

7

The

grave breaches regime of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 mandate the exercise of universal jurisdiction over those crimes. 30 8 While
304 See supra Part II.B.
305 PRINCETON PRINCIPLES, supra note 31, princ. 7(1).
306 Prosecutor v. Kallon & Kamara, Case Nos. SCSL-2004-15-AR72(E), SCSL-200416-AR72(E), Decision on Challenge to Jurisdiction: Lom6 Accord Amnesty, 1 71
(Mar. 13, 2004).
307 Although amnesty clauses for war crimes committed in international armed
conflict were generally incorporated in peace agreements prior to World War I, they
were vigorously rejected thereafter. Domb, supra note 23, at 256-57.
308 Geneva Convention I, supra note 90; Geneva Convention II; supra note 90;
Geneva Convention III, supra note 90; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 90. This
obligation was expanded upon in the 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 Relating to the Protection of Victims of International
Armed Conflicts (Protocol I),June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.; see also Michael Bothe,
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it is certainly possible that only the substantive provisions of the Conventions and not their procedural provisions have risen to the level of
custom, most commentators have accepted that, at least with respect
to war crimes committed in international armed conflict that fall
within the grave breaches regime, a fair (but not watertight) case can
be made not only for the existence of a customary international law
duty to prosecute or extradite the offender, but, as a corollary,3 0 9 for a
3 10
rule prohibiting blanket amnesties.
As regards noninternational armed conflicts, at least some take
the view that general amnesties are not only permitted, but are encouraged by existing law.3 1' This view relies upon Article 6(5) of Protocol II relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International
Armed Conflict, which provides: "At the end of hostilities, the authorities in power shall endeavor to grant the broadest possible amnesty to
persons who have participated in the armed conflict, or those deprived of their liberty for reasons related to the armed conflict,
3
whether they are interned or detained."

12

This provision was cited by the South African Constitutional
Court as supporting the validity, under international law, of the
amnesties granted by the South African Truth and Reconciliation
Commission.3 1 3 The decision may be criticized for being insuffiWar-Crimes in Non-InternationalArmed Conflicts, 24 ISR. Y.B. ON HUM. RTS. 241 (1994);
Domb, supra note 23, at 261.
309 There are two related, yet distinct, issues raised by the question of amnesties.
First, whether states have a duty to punish and prosecute (or extradite) those who
commit crimes falling under universal jurisdiction. Second, even if no such duty to
punish exists, whether international law recognizes the legality of amnesties for such
offenses. The two questions are often conflated, but they are distinct. One can answer the first question in the negative, for example, but still recognize that the absence of an affirmative obligation to prosecute does not permit states carte blanche in
their reaction to the commission of mass atrocities. On the other hand, an affirmative
duty to prosecute or extradite would appear to rule out the legality of amnesties.
310 Scholars are divided on this question. Professor Meron argues that every state
has a duty to try or extradite those guilty of grave breaches, and has "the right, although probably not the duty, to prosecute [other] serious violations of the Geneva
Conventions." Meron, supra note 105, at 23. On the other hand, states have generally not complied with this obligation, thereby undermining its claim as custom. BASSIOUNI & WISE, supra note 91, at 44-46; Cassese, supra note 11, at 5.
311 See Domb, supra note 23, at 266-67.
312 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II)
art. 6(5),June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609, 614 [hereinafter Protocol II]. One author
takes the position that this language was intended to apply to those combating the
State, not those acting as its agents. Schey et al., supra note 118, at 340.
313 Azanian Peoples Org. (AZAPO) v. The Presidentof the Republic 1996 (8) BCLR 1015
(CC) at 1033 (S. Mr.).
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ciently attentive to the international legal issues in question, in particular, for failing to analyze the crimes committed as crimes against
humanity (of which apartheid is clearly one), and neglecting to establish whether there exists any customary international law duty to punish offenders of a prior regime for such crimes.3 14 Moreover, both the
ICTY and the SCSL have made it clear that crimes committed in internal armed conflict cannot benefit from amnesties, at least before
those jurisdictions, and even more importantly, perhaps, the ICRC
takes the position that Article 6(5) may not be "invoked in favour of
impunity of war criminals, since it only applied to prosecution for the
sole participation in hostilities."3 1 5 Thus while soldiers may benefit
from a general amnesty for combatants, the ICRC takes the position
that they may not receive immunity for the commission of atrocities
3 16

during a conflict.

With respect to crimes against humanity and genocide, some
commentators have vigorously accepted the existence of a duty to investigate and punish human rights violations committed under a prior
regime.3 1 7 Certainly, the Genocide Convention and the Torture Convention suggest that a duty is assumed by States Parties to those conventions to pursue and punish (or extradite, in the case of the
Torture Convention) those who violate the Conventions' prohibitions. 318 However, even those treaties are unclear as to the precise
modalities of such punishment. They would thus appear to leave a
certain degree of discretion to national legal systems in their
implementation.
314 Dugard, supra note 114, at 302. This criticism is consistent with the notion that
there may be an international legal obligation to punish at least the worst offenders
after a civil war as a necessary corollary of the need to protect human rights. Bothe,
supra note 308, at 248 (arguing that principles of State Responsibility may require
prosecution). Nonetheless, while the distinction between international and noninternational armed conflict may be disappearing, it has not done so yet.
315 2 INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 4043 (JeanMarie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005).
316 Id.
317 Orentlicher, supra note 11, at 2546-48.
318 Article 1 of the Genocide Convention, provides that "genocide ... is a crime
under international law which they undertake to prevent and to punish." Genocide
Convention, supra note 88, art. 1. The Convention is not based on a principle of
universal jurisdiction, but of territorial jurisdiction; that is, pursuant to Article 6 of the
Convention, those charged with genocide or similar acts "shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was committed, or by [an]
international penal tribunal." Id. art. 6. Similarly, Article 4 of the Torture Convention requires States Parties to "ensure that all acts of torture are offences under
[their] criminal law" and Article 7 requires them to either extradite or prosecute
alleged torturers. Torture Convention, supra note 87, arts. 4, 7.
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As to a generalized customary international law rule requiring
punishment, the evidence of state practice is less forceful. At the
same time, although the human rights instruments that guarantee a
right to bodily integrity and freedom from torture and other abuses
do not typically, by their terms, require states to investigate and prosecute abuses of rights, 31 9 regional human rights courts and international human rights monitoring bodies have been unanimous in
imposing an affirmative obligation on states to investigate human
rights abuses. 320 Additionally, in 2001, the Inter-American Court rendered its first judgment on the merits of an amnesty, finding Peru's
32 1
amnesty laws incompatible with international law.

These decisions are highly significant, particularly when viewed in
light of emerging state practice. Without more, they perhaps do not
establish that a duty to investigate and prosecute is imposed upon
states as a matter of international law. However, they do suggest that a
319

Naomi Roht-Arrizia, Sources in International Treaties of an Obligation To Investi-

gate, Prosecute and Provide Redress, in

LAW

IMPUNITY AND

HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL

PRAcTiCE, supra note 108, at 24, 28.
320 The leading case is Veldsquez Rodriguez, 1988 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4
(July 29). Veldsquez has been followed by the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights to find that Chile's amnesty laws violated the right to judicial protection in the
Convention, as well as the State's duty to "prevent, investigate and punish" any violations of the rights found in the Convention. Hermosilla v. Chile, Case 10.843, InterAm. C.H.R., Report No. 36/96, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.95, doc. 7 rev. 73 (1996); see also
Espinoza v. Chile, Case 11.725, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 133/99, OEA/Ser.L./V/
11.106, doc. 6 rev.
102-07. The European Court of Human Rights has, similarly,
suggested that states may have affirmative obligations to prevent and remedy breaches
of the Convention in certain circumstances suggesting in one case that criminal prosecution could be required as part of that obligation. X & Y v. Netherlands, App. No.
8978/80, 8 Eur. Ct. H.R. Rep. 235, 241 (1985) (holding that the Netherlands was
required to adopt criminal law provisions to remedy sexual abuse of a mentally handicapped individual living in a home for mentally handicapped children because "the
protection afforded by the civil law in [this] case is . . . insufficient. This is a case
where fundamental values and essential aspects of private life are at stake. Effective
deterrence is indispensable in this area and it can be achieved only by criminal-law
provisions."); see also Selguk & Asker v. Turkey, App. Nos. 23184/94, 23185/94, 26
Eur. Ct. H.R. Rep. 477, 519-20 (1998). The Human Rights Committee has reached a
similar conclusion, finding that criminal prosecutions may sometimes be required.
OrentlicherImpunity Study, supra note 17, 1 37 n.48 (cases cited). Finally, the African
Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights has concluded that governments have
not only negative obligations, but affirmative duties to protect their citizens. SERAC &
CESR v. Nigeria, Comm. 155/96, 15th Annual Activity Report annex V,
57
(2001-2002), available at http://www.achpr.org/english/-doc-target/documentation.html?. ./activity-reports/activityl5-en.pdf.
321 Barrios Altos Case, 2001 Inter-Am- Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 75, at 14 (Mar. 14); see
also OrentlicherImpunity Study, supra note 17, 29.
AND
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prohibition against the grant of blanket amnesties for the commission
of jus cogens crimes may now have crystallized as a matter of general
customary international

law. 322

Although

some

countries

have

granted amnesties to the perpetrators of atrocities under a prior regime, amnesties that in some instances have been sustained by higher
courts, 3 2 3 this practice appears to be changing, certainly in countries
where democratic institutions have come to replace dictatorships or
military regimes, as the examples of Chile and Argentina seem to suggest. Indeed, it may be that amnesties are acceptable within a society
only so long as they are needed to provide stability, after which time
their beneficiaries need to "repay" the liberty they received under
duress.
The International Criminal Court Statute is explicit on certain
challenges to accountability such as superior orders,3 24 head of state
immunity, 32

5

and statute of limitations, 326 but is silent both as to any

duty to prosecute and with regard to amnesties. 32 7 Although the issue
was raised during the Rome Conference at which the Statute was
adopted, no clear consensus developed among the delegates as to how
the question should be resolved. This too suggests that customary international law had not crystallized on this point, at least not in 1998.
According to the Chairman of the Committee of the Whole of the
Diplomatic Conference, the question was purposely left open by the
drafters: while the Statute does not condone the use of amnesties by
its terms, presumably the Prosecutor has the power to accept them if
doing so would be "in the interests of justice. ''328
Finally, in regard to the international practice of the United Nations, although prior to the establishment of the International Criminal Court in 1998, international negotiators participated in amnesty
deals, consistent with recent jurisprudence on the subject, the United
Nations now takes the position that a grant of amnesty in the case of a
322 GEOFFREY ROBERTSON,
supra note 11, at 2568-81.

CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY

248-53 (2000); Orentlicher,

323 See, e.g., Hermosilla, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 36/96, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.95,
doc. 7 rev. 1 73 (describing decision of Supreme Court of Chile in 1990 to uphold a
self amnesty).
324 Rome Statute, supra note 13, art. 33.
325 Id. art. 27.
326 Id. art. 29.
327 For a good discussion of some of the issues raised by the Statute, see Scharf,
supra note 132, at 523-25.
328 Rome Statute, supra note 13, art. 53(2)(c). The delegates were largely unable
to achieve consensus on the issues of pardons, commutations and amnesties. SeeJohn

T. Holmes, The Principle of Complementarity,. in THE
THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT:

41 (Roy S. Lee ed., 1999).
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jus cogens crime is inconsistent with international law. As stated by the
U.N. Secretary-General in his 2000 report on the establishment of the

SCSL:
While recognizing that amnesty is an accepted legal concept
and a gesture of peace and reconciliation at the end of a civil war or
an internal armed conflict, the United Nations has consistently
maintained the position that amnesty cannot be granted in respect
of international crimes, such as genocide, crimes against humanity
3 29
or other serious violations of international humanitarian law.

1.

III.

THE EFFECT OF AMNESTIES FOR JUS COGENS CRIMES

A.

The Effect of Domestic Amnesties forJus Cogens Crimes

Before National Courts

As the ICJ noted in the Yerodia case 33 0 (and the Special Court for
Sierra Leone noted as well), a domestic amnesty is valid in the state
where granted, unless that state decides otherwise (through a regime
change or otherwise). However, the situation before a court in a third
state is quite different. Having concluded that the accountability paradigm is normatively desirable (even if not legally required), we are
squarely faced with its operation through the mechanism of universal
jurisdiction exercised either by states or the international community
as a whole. States seeking to exercise universal jurisdiction over perpetrators do so pursuant to internal legislation adapted to that end. If
faced with claims of a defendant's immunity, granted by domestic amnesty provisions, how should the state in question (the forum state)
respond?
With respect to amnesties or immunities granted by municipal
law, the first question to be answered is what law applies. Public international law has not yet developed a system of conflicts of laws to address this question, because it is largely operating under the Lotus
paradigm: every state being an independent sovereign, every state may
apply its law to a problem unless there is some rule prohibiting it from
doing so. 3 3 1 Moreover, many states refuse to enforce foreign public
329 The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-Ceneralon the Establishment of a Special Courtfor Sierra Leone, 22, delivered to the Security Council U.N. Doc. S/2000/915
(Oct. 4, 2000); see also The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-Generalon the Rule
of Law and TransitionalJustice in Conflict and Post Conflict Societies,
6, 7, 18, delivered to

the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616 (Aug. 23, 2004).
330 2002 I.C.J. 1 (Feb. 14).
331 S.S. "Lotus" (Fr. v. Tur.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7), available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/cijwww/cdecisions/ccpij/serieA/A 10/30-LotusArret.pdf.
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law, and would consider criminal proceedings as well as amnesty laws
"public," applying what one writer has dubbed the "'public law taboo.' "332 Yet to the extent that national courts are using universal
jurisdiction as the basis for the trial of perpetrators that otherwise
have no connection to the forum (as in the Pinochet case, for example), they are already applying, through the medium of international
law, an exception to the rule that penal jurisdiction is generally territorial in character. Thus, the national court exercising universal jurisdiction has a dual role: to apply and interpret national law, and to
effectively sit as a court of the international community, applying international legal norms. Thus in considering what effect a national
amnesty should have before a foreign court, it is appropriate to consider whether the applicable law should be the law of the forum state,
the law of the state granting the defendant immunity, the law of the
state of the defendant's nationality, the law of the state upon whose
territory the crimes were committed (the territorial state), or interna3 33
tional law to resolve the question.
While a full treatment of this subject is beyond the scope of this
Article, I will nonetheless suggest some general parameters that may
be of use. To begin with; surely, it would be paradoxical for the forum
state to use the law of the state granting immunity as the measure of
its own exercise of universal jurisdiction. First, as most of these crimes
are committed in internal conflicts by regimes in power, the state
granting immunity will typically be the state of the defendant's nationality as well as the territorial state. Assuming the defendant is charged
with a violation of clear norms of international law, there can be no
issue relating to nullum crimen, nullum pcana sine lege--no punishment
without law-if an amnesty granted after the crime's commission is
ultimately ineffective if the defendant travels abroad.3 3 4 Moreover,
332 William S. Dodge, Breaking the Public Law Taboo, 43

HAnv. INT'L

L.J. 161, 161

(2002) (quoting Andreas Lowenfeld, Public Law in the InternationalArena: Conflict of
Laws, International Law, and Some Suggestions for Their Interaction, 163 RECUEIL DES
Cous 311, 322-26 (1979) (Neth.)).
333 The Princeton Principles have a provision on conflicts of jurisdiction, proffering
a set of criteria upon which states might base a decision to prosecute a particular case,
or not, in the case of a demand for extradition of the accused. PRINCETON PRINCIPLES,
supra note 31, princ. 8.
334 This may be less true, however, in the case of conditional amnesties, where the
defendant has voluntarily come forward and placed him or herself in jeopardy of
prosecution by confessing the crime. In this case, the better rule may be that the
forum state should examine the particular proceeding to see if the principle of ne bis
in idem should attach and immunize the particular defendant from subsequent prosecutions. Again, the issue arises whether the forum uses its own rules or an international rule of ne bis in idem. The practical response of most fora will most likely be to
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many immunities are granted by regimes to themselves just before
they step down, or are extracted from a successor regime with threats
of rebellion and violence. The former situation is a classic example of
law that is blatantly self-interested and probably illegitimate. The second situation, while involving amnesties granted by a presumably legitimate government, could appear to be an illegal contract, void ab
initio, if the beneficiary seeks to enforce it, as against public policy and
extracted by duress. 33 5 As noted earlier, the SCSL and the Supreme
Court of Mexico both came to the conclusion that a domestic amnesty
granted as regards a jus cogens crime cannot affect the jurisdiction of a
third state.
Assuming then that it is not a state other than the forum whose
law should govern the question whether the amnesty or other immunity is valid, the choices remaining are the law of the forum and international law. I discuss the last possibility first. The international law
criminalizing gross abuses of human rights has developed considerably since the Second World War. As noted earlier, the explicit thesis
of this Article is that the substantive norms, whether initially established by treaty or by custom, are well established norms of customary
international law, and indeed, jus cogens norms that are nonderogable
in nature.3 36 This position appears to be confirmed by most recent
state court decisions, and was reaffirmed during the Rome Diplomatic
Conference to establish the International Criminal Court, where
most governments were comfortable codifying these norms and applying them universally in the event the Security Council referred a particular case to the Court. A state investigating a non-national for one
of these crimes pursuant to an exercise of universal jurisdiction, is
thus applying, through the medium of its national law, international
law. What is not clear is whether the state is bound, in the absence of
a specific treaty obligation, to apply international rules related to the
substantive norm. The most that can be said is that there is at least
some evidence that a state is required to do so, at least as to certain
rules.
First, as outlined in Part I.A, the Charter and judgment of the
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg clearly affirmed the primacy of international law over national law, at least insofar as crimes
against peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity were conuse some combination of the two, due to the fact that the international law on the
subject is not well codified, and the need to balance the competing interests involved.
335 As between the state of nationality and the territorial state, if the two were to
differ, it would seem logical to look first to the territorial state, the application of the
criminal law generally being territorial in nature.
336 See supra text accompanying note 31; see also Bassiouni, supra note 150, at 411.
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cerned. The Charter essentially abolished the defense of superior orders, and was explicit in rejecting municipal law as a defense to an
international crime. The Nuremberg principles were adopted in a
resolution by the United Nations General Assembly in 1946,33 7 and

have not been seriously questioned since. It would seem odd for international law to prime national law, only for national law to extinguish the legal obligation imposed either through the application of a
statute of limitations, amnesty or some other form of domestic immunity. Although there was some doubt as to whether a rule concerning
33 8
the statute of limitations existed in customary international law,
that doubt would seem to be laid to rest after the widespread adoption
of the Rome Statute which provides that the crimes therein are subject to no period of limitations.3 3 9 Moreover, recently some jurisdictions have been adopting provisions abolishing the statute of
limitations as regards at least certain jus cogens crimes. 340 Similarly,
the issue of superior orders is clearly addressed in the Rome Statute,
and its widespread adoption by states will presumably create a clear
legal rule on this question. Thus, although the manner in which international law is applied by states is generally a question of national
law, given that these particular rules of international law appear to be
inextricably intertwined with the application of a jus cogens norm of
fundamental importance, the better rule would be that national legal
systems are bound, as a matter of international law, to apply interna-

337 G.A. Res. 96 (I), U.N. Doc. A/61/Add.1 (Dec. 11, 1946).
338 There are two treaties on the subject, but they have not been widely adopted.
Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and
Crimes Against Humanity, Nov. 26, 1968, 754 U.N.T.S. 75. The convention came into
force on November 11, 1970, and according to the United Nation's website, currently
has only nine signatories and forty-nine parties. United Nations, Convention on the
Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partl/chapterlV/
treaty8.asp (last visited Dec. 20, 2005). Shortly thereafter, the Council of Europe
adopted a similar Convention. European Convention on the Non-Applicability of
Statutory Limitation to Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes, openedfor signature
Jan. 25, 1974, Europ. T.S. No. 82, 13 I.L.M. 540. The European Convention was only
ratified by two states and never entered into force. Interestingly, both conventions
were largely a response to German statutes of limitation that would have caused Nazi
crimes to prescribe, and prevented prosecution. This result, which was apparently
perceived as desirable in Germany, was viewed as unacceptable by many other countries. See Sadat Wexler, supra note 204, 318-21.
339 Rome Statute, supra note 13, art. 29 ("The crimes within the jurisdiction of the
Court shall not be subject to any statute of limitations.").
340 OrentlicherImpunity Study, supra note 17, 11 47- 48.
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tional, and not1 national, rules regarding superior orders and statutes
of limitation.

3 4

Head of state immunity presents a slightly different problem, as
the House of Lords recognized in the Pinochetcase, for if international
law abolishes head of state immunity as regards the internationalprosecution of current, as well as former, heads of state, national prosecutions of current leaders (unlike their predecessors) might unduly
strain the international legal system, which is still premised largely on
the sovereign equality of states. The ICJ took this view in its recent
decision in the Yerodia case, 3 4 2 as discussed earlier, and the decision
on the immunity of Charles Taylor of the Special Court for Sierra Leone appears compatible with these views.
I turn now to the last issue, the difficult question of amnesty, either de facto or de jure. 343 If we reject the law of the state granting

the amnesty as a source of law to apply (for the reasons given above or
through a simple refusal to accord the amnesty any extraterritorial
effect), we must assume the relevant law to be the national law of the
forum state. 344 Of course, it is quite likely, however, that the forum
state may not have any law on the question, for its legislature probably
has not considered the problem. Thus, the remainder of this section
proposes some policy considerations that a court in the forum state
might use in evaluating a foreign amnesty, keeping in mind that it will
need to balance the international community's interest in pursuing
justice against concerns of comity and the importance of respecting
the difficult choices a particular jurisdiction has made as to how it will
treat the perpetrators of past atrocities.
Courts in the forum state should keep in mind that amnesties are
disfavored, perhaps even illegal, in international law, particularly as
341 This appears to be the view taken by the Special Court for Sierra Leone, as
discussed earlier. How national courts accomplish this is of course a question of domestic constitutional law.
342 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 1, 1 60
(Feb. 14), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iCOBE/icobejudgment/icobe-ijudgment 20020214.PDF.
343 Pardons and conditional amnesties may be distinguishable, for both involve
the use of judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and involve particularized consideration of a defendant's guilt or innocence in a particular case. Assuming the proceedings are not a sham, even where amnesties are generally prohibited, pardons and
conditional amnesties may be acceptable, or even required by the legality principle, if
the defendant has been "put in jeopardy" of criminal proceedings.
344 "Pure" cases of universal jurisdiction appear to be quite rare. Rather, there
generally appears to be some connection between the defendant and the forum state,
in most instances, again suggesting the appropriateness of the forum applying its law
to the question.
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regards those who bear the most responsibility for the commission of
a particular atrocity. Moreover, to permit national amnesties to extinguish obligations imposed by international law would seem contrary
to the foundational principles of international criminal law, and stand
in opposition to the clear weight of authority and much of the state
and international practice emerging in this field. This should create a
presumption that the forum should refuse the amnesty. This presumption would be rebuttable, however, in specific cases. First, even
the International Criminal Court Statute does not prohibit amnesties
per se. Instead, as noted earlier, it leaves open the possibility that
some amnesties might serve the interest ofjustice. Assuming the decision is made in good faith, national fora presumably have the same
margin of appreciation. Their courts may already be overburdened,
the defendant may have already been placed "in jeopardy" of criminal
prosecution elsewhere, or comity may require that the forum state abstain from prosecution in a specific case, particularly with respect to
conditional amnesties that have resulted from a carefully negotiated
and potentially fragile agreement entered into as part of a transition
to democracy. Of course, a state may use other filtering mechanisms
in evaluating the viability of a particular exercise of universal jurisdiction, such as the "subsidiarity principle" suggested by the Spanish
courts, or the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, as Belgium's law
provides.3 4 5 In the United States, U.S. conflicts principles or the doctrine of comity may be employed to determine when and under what
circumstances a U.S. court should entertain a prosecution of a foreign
national if that individual invokes a foreign amnesty. 346 Indeed, as-

suming the decision of the forum state is made without the influence
of political pressure, and pursuant to sound jurisprudential reasoning,
a case-by-case approach to the problem of amnesties serves the interest of justice more than a per se rule.
Before concluding this section, it is worth noting that the conundrum posited by the application of international law by national legal
345 Of course, the exercise of prosecutorial discretion raises its own set of
problems. Cf Allison Marston Danner, Enhancing the Legitimacy and Accountability of
ProsecutorialDiscretion at the International Criminal Court, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 510 (2003).

Indeed, a Danish public prosecutor was recently criticized for bowing to political pressure by refusing to arrest a visiting Russian general, Anatoly Kulikov, accused of alleged war crimes in Chechnya, given that Chechen Deputy Prime Minister Akhmed
Zakayev had been arrested in 2002 following a Russian request to hold him on
charges of terrorism. Denmark Rejects Call To Arrest Visiting Russian General, AGENCE
FRANCE PRESSE, Mar. 22, 2005, available in LEXIS, Agence France Presse-English File.
346 Cf Hartford Fire Ins. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 797-98 (1993); Timberlane

Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 612 (9th Cir. 1976).
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systems is not new. All legal systems involving multiple and overlapping courts must address this problem, and it is a particularly interesting feature of both horizontal and vertical transjudicial process. As an
example, consider the doctrine elaborated by the United States Supreme Court to govern the application of state law by federal courts.
In the case of ErieRailroad Co. v. Tompkins, 34 7 the Court held, as is well
known, that federal courts sitting in diversity were required to apply
state law to decide the case before them.3 48 The Court was later faced
with the question, similar to our problem here, of what the state law
governing a case included. That is, if New York law was to be applied
to govern the tort liability of a particular defendant, should New
York's statute of limitations apply to the case, or was the federal court
free to apply its own law to the problem? In a series of sometimes
vexing decisions, the Supreme Court suggested that many factors
would govern whether state or federal law would apply, in particular
relying upon whether the application of one or the other would be
outcome determinative,3 49 or bound up in the rights and obligations
created by the state law to be applied.3 50 Thus, if the state law question was "substantive," state law applied. If it was simply procedural,
federal law applied. The Court has often suggested that the purpose
of the Erie doctrine, aside from its constitutional underpinnings, was
to avoid "forum shopping" and the "inequitable administration of the
laws." 35 1 Erie and its progeny have plagued first-year law students ever
since its elaboration, but there is no doubt that federal and quasi-federal systems in which many courts may potentially hear a case need to
systematize the situation and balance the competing interests involved
if the legal rules sought to be enforced are not to be undermined by
inconsistent and widely varying application.
The European Court of Justice has developed similar doctrines
governing the application of European law by national courts. (This
is Erie in reverse.) Faced with the disparate application of EU law by
national courts, the ECJ has, through a set of complex and sophisticated cases, developed doctrines that require national courts to apply
EU law, but allow them a certain degree of discretion in how they do
so. A central point in the ECJ's jurisprudence, however, which Erie
underscores, is that a national court's application of procedural rules
to an EU cause of action may not discriminate against the application
347
348
349
350
351

304 U.S. 64 (1938).
Id. at 78.
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945).
Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 535 (1958).
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965).
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of Community law, or completely vitiate the substantive right, nor
352
render the right impossible to exercise in practice.
The relationship between EU courts and national courts, and between federal and state courts in the United States are of course quite
different than the diffuse and relatively informal links that characterize the relationship of national courts to each other, to other international tribunals such as the ICTY and ICTR, and to the ICC and the
ICJ. The treaties establishing the European Communities and the European Union form a nascent constitution constraining the member
states, the communities and the EU in a much more formal and legal
relationship than exists in the international arena. Similarly the balance between the federal and state courts in the United States is governed by a written constitution. Nevertheless, as the international
legal system matures, and takes on its own constitutional form, it may
be instructive to consider case law elaborated in two well developed
two-tier legal systems as a guide to doctrines that might ultimately be
useful to international criminal law.
2.

Before International Courts and Tribunals

The international jurisprudence on the subject appears uniform
on this point: domestic amnesties, whatever their legality ab initio cannot immunize an accused faced with prosecution before an international court. It is interesting to note that the courts so opining have
353
yet to provide much in the way of a ratio decidendifor their holdings;
however, it is this author's contention that national amnesties have no
play before international courts for at least two reasons. First, as the
Special Court for Sierra Leone hinted in its opinion, the problem of
frictions between sovereigns in a horizontal relationship of full equality simply does not exist in the international context. Second, given
the primacy and hierarchical status of the norms as jus cogens, it has
been true since the Nuremberg trials that international courts exercising (international) universal jurisdiction have not been bound by municipal law that would serve as an obstacle to prosecution. That is, the
holdings of the ICJ and the SCSL, as well as the many national court
decisions and commentaries to the same effect, rest on an understanding of the international legal order as autonomous from and existing in a vertical relationship to (at least for these purposes)
sovereign states. Thus, the status of amnesties for jus cogens crimes,
352 PAUL CRAIG & GRAINNE DE BURCA, EU LAW: TEXT, CASES, AND MATERIALS
214-15 (2d ed. 1998).
353 More may be coming soon from the International Court of Justice in the case
of Congo v. France.
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while seemingly banal, raise fundamental questions concerning the
structure and function of the global constitutional order.
B.

The Effect of TransnationalAmnesties (Exile)forJus Cogens Crimes

The question posed by this section is a simple one: what is the
legal status of an individual accused of a jus cogens crime, who has
sought and been given refuge in a third state? This is not so much a
question of international law but of common sense: the short answer
appears to be that the individual may benefit from the grant of asylum
within the state of refuge under the constitutional system in place
there, but presumably could not travel with his immune status, for it
would cease to have any effect outside the territory of the state of refuge. (Returning to the Idi Amin example raised at the beginning of
this Article, it will be recalled that the Ugandan government stated
that he would be arrested if he returned from his exile in Saudi Arabia.) Given that criminal laws are generally laws of territorial application, surely it cannot be that granting immunity to Charles Taylor in
Nigeria, for example, or to Idi Amin in Saudi Arabia, affects the prescriptive jurisdiction of the territorial state. Thus, the effect of a transnational amnesty (exile) in the territorial state (or presumably any
third state as well), would appear to be null. Similarly, as is the case
with domestic amnesties before international courts, presumably any
grant of exile has no legal effect before an international court (as the
SCSL held by implication in the Charles Taylor case).
C.

The Effect of InternationalAmnesties forJus Cogens Crimes

The question arises whether individual responsibility for the commission of international crimes can be abrogated by treaty or even by
the Security Council itself. As regards the effect of an "amnesty treaty"
in national courts, some interesting questions arise. Although there is
some contention on this point, it is currently the practice of the
United Nations to reject amnesty for crimes against humanity and genocide (and presumably serious violations of international humanitarian law, as well) .4 We have, of course, already seen that amnesty is
disfavored in state practice and by international courts. Moreover,
most international criminal law treaties, particularly the Rome Statute,
the Genocide Convention, the Torture Convention, the Grave
Breaches provisions of the Geneva Conventions, and many antiterrorism treaties arguably prohibit amnesties by their requirement that offenders must be punished. Thus, presumably this problem will not
354

Robinson, supra note 20, at 483.
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surface extensively. However, if immunity is granted pursuant to a
Treaty to which the forum state is not a party, it is difficult to see why
it should or would apply. Indeed, implicit in the amnesty opinion of
the SCSL, is a holding that the agreement is binding upon the parties-just not upon the Special Court. Thus, in principle it seems possible that states could bind themselves by an international agreement
to that effect, not to engage in criminal prosecutions of each others
nationals, even for the commission of jus cogens crimes. On the other
hand, given that the crimes are covered by peremptory norms of international law, and that most international instruments either defining
them or creating adjudicatory mechanisms state that a duty to prosecute such crimes exists, it may be that such a treaty is against international public policy and would be as void as a treaty permitting the
commission of those crimes in the first place.3 55 As we saw above, in
such cases, although the amnesties might be enforceable in the territorial state, presumably they would have no effect in a third state or
before an international court or tribunal.
But if we suppose that the Security Council has in some way countenanced the grant of exile, or, acting pursuant to its Chapter VII
powers, ordered an amnesty the question becomes quite difficult. If
the Resolution is adopted pursuant to Chapter VII of the Charter and
directed to all Member States, pursuant to Article 25 of the Charter,
3 56
all states would be required to comply with the amnesty agreement.
The question, of course, remains whether such a resolution would be
ultra vires. (And of course, even if it were beyond the Council's powers, would any remedy be available to a state wishing to contest the
Council's actions?) This possibility appears much more probable
than an "amnesty treaty" because the recent practice of the Security
Council has been to accept (at least in some cases), language in Council resolutions that may immunize nationals of certain countries from
prosecution for the commission of jus cogens crimes. The most recent
example is Resolution 1593, which grants contributing states exclusive
jurisdiction over their nationals for all "alleged acts or omissions arising out of or related to operations in Sudan. '3 57 In this case, even the
territorial state has been deprived of jurisdiction, and even if the contributing state declines to investigate allegations of war crimes.
355 Cf Vienna Convention, supra note 32, art. 53.
356 U.N. Charter art. 25.
357 S.C. Res. 1593, supra note 172,
6. Earlier resolutions include Resolution
1497, adopted by the Council on August 1, 2003, to address the threat to peace and
security in Liberia, operative paragraph 7 of which is substantially identical to Resolution 1593, see S.C. Res. 1497, 7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1497 (Aug. 1, 2003), and Resolution 1422, see Sec. Res. 1422, 1, U.N. Doc. S/Res.1422 (July 12, 2002).
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Even when acting under Chapter VII, the Security Council is limited to the powers granted it pursuant to the U.N. Charter, and the
ICJ has suggested that its actions are not above the law. 358 On the

other hand, the ICJ has never invalidated a Security Council Resolution. 359 Moreover, Article 16 of the International Criminal Court's

Statute appears to grant the Council a role in criminal prosecutions in
conjunction with its mandate to promote international peace. Article
16 provides that the Council may stop a prosecution from proceeding
(for one year) by requiring an affirmative vote from the Council to
that effect. 360

This may suggest that the granting of an amnesty is

somehow perceived by the international community as properly
within the ambit of the Council's powers; or, given how narrowly it
constrains the Council, it could be seen as only a small concession to
the Council granted to cover an emergency situation. Certainly, a territorial state might wish to challenge such a Security Council Resolution; as to the amnesty's status before an international court, it is
unclear how the International Criminal Court, for example, would
treat an amnesty imposed pursuant to Security Council Resolution,
although the court would presumably think hard before disregarding
3
it out of hand.

61

358 Order with Regard to Request for Indication of Provisional Measures in the
Case Concerning Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal
Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v.
U.K), 1992 I.C.J. 3 (Apr. 14); (Libyan ArabJamahiriya v. U.S)., 1992 I.C.J. 114 (Apr.
14).
359 The ICJ has however affirmed its competence to decide whether U.N. organs
have acted in conformity with the Charter when the issue arises in the normal course
of its judicial functions. See, e.g., Legal Consequences for States of the Continued
Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security
Council Resolution 276, Advisory Opinion, 1970 I.C.J. 16, 45 (Jun. 21).
360 This provision was relied upon by the United States to bring about the adoption of Resolution 1422 (renewing the U.N. peacekeeping mission in Bosnia) on July
12, 2002, which provided that no personnel from a state not party to the Rome Statute
could be brought before the International Criminal Court for a twelve-month period,
pursuant to Article 16 of the International Criminal Court Statute. S.C. Res. 1422,
1; see Mohamed El Zeidy, The United States Dropped the Atomic Bomb of
supra note 357,
Article 16 on the ICC Statute: Security Council Power of Deferrals and Resolution 1422, 35
VAND.

J.

TRANSNAT'L

L. 1503, 1511 (2002). It was renewed over the objections of

several states one year later as Resolution 1487, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1487 (June 12,
2003), and in 2003, following the Abu Ghraib prison scandal, when other members of
the Council voiced determined opposition, the Resolution was withdrawn.
361 See Scharf, supra note 132, at 522-24.
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CONCLUSION

Societies in transition are messy places, in which delivering justice
is a difficult, laborious and often frustrating process. Large numbers
of perpetrators, overwhelmed institutions, poverty, and weak social cohesion may make the process of bringing perpetrators to book extraordinarily difficult, even impossible, particularly in the most ideal
forum, the country in which the crimes were perpetrated. In such a
case, international assistance, and probably international prosecutions, will be a vital component of restoring peace and combating impunity. Indeed, international law may take on a pivotal role, offering
"an alternative construction of law that, despite substantial political
3 62
change, is continuous and enduring."
Yet international criminal justice is not and should not be a "one
size fits all" proposition, nor is it a panacea for the world's ills. The
South African experience suggests that although the criminal law is an
important tool, where a society is able to come together in a democratic process and engage in deliberation concerning the fate of perpetrators of atrocities under a former regime, some of which may be
prosecuted, others not, that decision should be respected. Yet the exception must not be substituted for the rule: both state and international practice now suggest that exile and amnesty is a largely
unacceptable response to the commission of jus cogens crimes.
Although it may be, as the Special Court for Sierra Leone has
intimated, that amnesties, even for the commission of jus cogens
crimes, are lawful in the territorial state, a proposition that appears
increasingly tenuous, the cases to date have unanimously concluded
that the amnesties cannot "travel" with efficacy to other jurisdictions,
and, in particular, are without force before international courts and
tribunals. Indeed, whether that practice has crystallized as an absolute
legal prohibition seems of decreasing importance, given the transnational legal process of norm construction that increasingly renders it
politically and socially unacceptable (even if not illegal per se) in virtually all cases to promote impunity. The current practice of some
governments, and particularly the United States, to reject accountability in certain circumstances thus appears either opportunistic or
maybe even cynical, representing not so much a real challenge to this
emerging norm of international law and politics, but an assertion of
raw power. As such, offers of asylum to Saddam Hussein and Charles
362 Ruti Teitel, TransitionalJurisprudence: The Role of Law in Political Transformation,
106 YALE L.J. 2009, 2028 (1997).
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Taylor, for example, do not evince the emergence of a new paradigm
363
but instead constitute unacceptable exceptions to the rule.

As suggested by the cases studied in this Article, individuals, as
well as societies, appear to seek justice just as intently as they seek
peace. Survivors pursue their tormentors across long periods of space
and time, often waiting years until conditions permit their cause to be
heard. As a result, the efforts by international negotiators to swap amnesty for peace appear to offer little more than a temporary respite for
international criminals, and have little staying power outside the
country where negotiated. Moreover, what longitudinal case studies
we have suggest that our intuitions about amnesties for the commission of atrocities are correct-that they promote a culture of impunity
in which violence remains the norm rather than the exception. In
light of these practical realities, arguments that amnesties may contribute to or be necessary for peace seem to have little moral or persuasive force. Finally, there is some evidence that the credible threat
of punishment may in time affect the behavior of perpetrators, making international criminal justice an important component of constraining inter and intra-state violence and the commission of
atrocities.
States and the international community have important, independent and mutually reinforcing roles to play in this process. As the
international legal system matures with the inevitability wrought by
the process of globalization, and its constitutional structure emerges,
international criminal law has become an important arena in which
boundaries between national legal systems and the international legal
order are being continuously negotiated and tested in a fascinating
example of transnational legal process. International courts have
been called upon to consider the validity of national amnesties and
have issued important decisions reflecting upon the status and import
of international legal norms. National courts have also played an important role in this dialogue, considering not only the opinions of
sister tribunals but their international brethren. Although less the
subject of this Article, national legislatures have entered the fray as
well, debating the proper scope and application of laws based upon
universal jurisdiction, and the desirability and importance of prosecuting international crimes. Emerging from this study is an extraordina363 Exceptions that not even the United States has seriously maintained, given that
Saddam Hussein has been turned over to the Iraqi Special Tribunal for trial, and the
U.S. government has come under increasing pressure to do something about bringing Charles Taylor before the SCSL. Ken Guggenheim, Bush Urged To Take Action on
Ex-Dictator, ASSOCIATED PRisss, Apr. 9, 2005, available in LEXIS, Associated Press
Online.

1036

NOTRE DAME

LAW

REVIEW

[VOL. 81:3

rily complex picture of "law in action"-of courts considering not only
the importance of accountability in the interest of justice, but of appropriate limits on their own extension of power.through the development and application of doctrines of comity, subsidiarity and
complementarity. In this way, the global constitution is being constructed, bit by bit, piece by piece-neither exclusively from the top
down, nor entirely from the bottom up-but up, down, and even sideways-all at the same time.

